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Abstract
This thesis addresses New Orleans’ “Bio-Med” sector, a broad category that includes biosciences
research, health care, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturing.
Biotechnology, in particular, has emerged as an attractive target for economic development in
New Orleans, in Louisiana, and in the nation as a whole. Informed by economic geography and
development literature, this research presents a narrative of efforts to foster the Bio-Med
industries in New Orleans as a source of economic diversification and employment. Structural
economic conditions, as well as a complex and unsettled array of political agendas shaping BioMed institutions, underscore a pessimistic view of the potential for biotechnology to generate
significant economic impacts. Since Katrina exacerbated these conditions, Bio-Med strategies
should direct more attention to the health care industry and specifically to addressing workforce
gaps to meet the twin goals of expanding health coverage and providing realistic employment
opportunities for underserved populations.

vi

I. Introduction and Definitions
Economic decline has marked New Orleans since the mid-1980s oil price collapse
initiated massive job loss and downtown decline. Even before such dramatic local recession,
economic development and metropolitan governance proceeded along a path marked by
“fragmentation” (Lauria et al. 1995, 106). After the bottom fell out of New Orleans’ overdependence on the oil and gas industries, city officials and private developers increasingly
sought to draw on the city’s historically rich tourism industry as an economic development
strategy; and tourism has indeed proven vital to the city’s rebound in terms of both downtown
redevelopment and employment (Lauria et al. 1995). However, tourism’s success – almost
axiomatically – has fostered problematic path dependence. Tourism has reshaped downtown to
house primarily tourist uses along the riverfront while other areas have declined; and the city’s
workforce occupies a plurality of relatively low-paying, insecure jobs in the tourism and
hospitality industries, where few opportunities exist for advancement. By the early 1990s,
however, state and local economic development agencies had initiated a focus on the
biotechnology and biosciences sector as a new engine for economic growth and downtown
development.
At least, that was the situation before August 29th, 2005. On that date, Hurricane Katrina
sacked New Orleans with massive flood damage, violence, and confusion during its disastrous
aftermath. As with nearly every aspect of life in the city, Katrina dramatically altered the
structures underlying economic development, as the wholesale destruction of New Orleans’
essential infrastructure, housing, and labor force – as well as the nationwide perception of
bumbling city and state leadership amidst federal neglect – pose an almost impossibly daunting
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deterrent to future capital investment. In the months following the disaster several plans
emerged, both to guide comprehensive rebuilding strategies and to present a unified front to
congressional funding measures. In particular, early economic development frameworks
produced by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), Louisiana Recovery Authority
(LRA), and the Urban Land Institute sought to foster the tourism and cultural sector as the
quickest path to immediate recovery but advanced the biosciences and health care sectors as the
most likely source of long-term economic diversification and sustainability. Over the course of
an unprecedented mayoral race in the ensuing months, major candidates ubiquitously paid
frequent lip service to these industries as factors in both health care reconstruction and economic
diversification schemes. At the time of this writing over one year after the hurricane, this focus
is gaining traction as early policy frameworks crystallize into more formal plans. Meanwhile,
outside of New Orleans, nurturing local biotechnology and biosciences industries has coalesced
into a national trend in recent years, owing mainly to the attractive level of investment and the
high quality of employment involved, in addition to potential spin-off jobs.
And yet, many uncertainties remain. This thesis attempts to situate biotechnology and
biosciences strategies in the New Orleans Region within a broader framework, first within the
context of existing literature on the subject and then within in the complex, multifaceted political
economies governing the implementation of such an exceptionally interdisciplinary economic
project. The opening chapter defines several terms relating to the range of “Bio-Med” industries,
an inclusive category into which a broad group of activities taking place in New Orleans have
been condensed (BNOB 2006). In the literature review chapter (Ch.2), the first section draws
from a cursory review of extensive literature on regional innovation systems – or industrial
“clusters” – to sketch out an account of how economic development policies recently have
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attempted to shape their constituent regions into loci for internationally competitive, knowledgeintensive, high-technology industries. The review sheds light on the locally “embedded”
qualities of the economic geographies into which high-technology industries situate themselves
and comments on how academic knowledge on clusters filters down to the policymakers who
attempt to foster cluster development. The second half of Chapter 2 hones in specifically on
biotechnology and how the industry has concentrated into a select few regions over the course of
its relatively short history. Out of the case studies presented, several common characteristics and
strategies emerge as necessary to support a successful biotech cluster, including economic
diversity, a local capacity for entrepreneurialism, a skilled industry-relevant workforce, a
prestigious research university, and an active leadership structure. The third and longest chapter
treats New Orleans’ attempt to cultivate a biotechnology industry out of its strengths in medical
research. As narrated in this thesis, biotechnology and biosciences initiatives proceeded slowly
before Hurricane Katrina, although the state had enacted several noteworthy initiatives in recent
years. Since Katrina, a new political economy focused on recovery and directed by a complex
web of federal, state, and local influences is in the process of hashing out several long-term
reforms and structural changes in the Bio-Med industries. These changes will undoubtedly
impact current attempts to reconstruct the Bio-Med industry in general and, more specifically, to
build on pre-Katrina initiatives.
This thesis argues for tempered optimism regarding the potential for biotechnology to
serve as a substantial economic base in the New Orleans Region, even before the challenges
posed by the current post-disaster environment. However, several proposed reforms in the
regional health care system could underlie substantial changes in the role of health care in the
regional economy, especially with greater coordination of policy agendas largely fragmented
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between industries and scales of governance. Ultimately, health care industrial and occupational
strategies may provide a more realistic source of regional economic growth, potentially
generating wide-ranging benefits for workers at a diverse range of skill levels.
The Bio-Med industry is, by nature, interdisciplinary. It encompasses university
“biosciences” research, entrepreneurial commercialization of high-tech research
(“biotechnology”), and the delivery of health services (the health care industry). As such, this
thesis has attempted to paint a holistic picture by remaining conscious of the contextual
differences among the various fields involved. In addition, policies and plans generated on a
variety of scales of governance shape the Bio-Med industries in New Orleans. The account
presented here focuses on the region as the unit of analysis but also considers state-level policies
as they pertain to New Orleans. Of necessity, the research draws from a variety of sources.
Most descriptions of Bio-Med industries and strategies are derived from secondary sources and
government documents. Media publications, attendance at public meetings, and information and
conversations stemming from the author’s personal (if relatively brief) employment in the field
of public health have provided additional sources.

Defining the Bio-Med Industry
Fostering the Bio-Med sector has long served as a goal for New Orleans’ universities,
hospitals, economic development professionals, and government. Likewise, in the uncertain
post-Katrina landscape, this sector remains explicitly targeted for growth efforts: “The
devastation of the Bio-Med base in the New Orleans metro area threatens to kill the goose that
lays the golden egg” (BNOB 2005, 45). But what sort of economic activity constitutes this Bio-
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Med sector? In other words, to examine the existing and prospective linkages and functions
encompassed within the Bio-Med sector, the term “biomedical” first must be defined, along with
various related categories like biotechnology, health care, health services, medical devices and
pharmaceutical manufacturing, and life sciences research and development. This section
considers definitions to the “Bio-med” base articulated in strategic documents for New Orleans
and compares these terms with standard industry definitions among technical and academic
analyses.
The Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), a mayoral group that created the
highest-profile initial local policy framework after Katrina, specifically treats the “Bio-Med”
industry in its economic development plan. The authors of this plan employ the abbreviated term
Bio-Med simultaneously as inclusive of several medical-related activities and as synonymous
with the health care industry: “This plan covers the broadly classified ‘Bio-Med’ or health care
industry which includes five categories under the US Census Bureau North American Industry
Classification (NAICS) codes: health care services, health care insurance, life sciences R&D,
medical devices and pharmaceuticals” (BNOB 2006, 31). This definition echoes pre-Katrina
economic development language. Specifically, in 1991, the state legislature created the New
Orleans Biomedical Research and Development Park (BRDP), an organizational unit designed to
foster the potential of the downtown medical cluster as an economic development district. As an
organizational unit, this district’s membership and geographical boundaries essentially mirror
those of the New Orleans Medical Complex (NOrMC), a non-profit organization whose mission
is to enhance the image and development of the regional medical center located in the Park.
From these labels, it may be concluded that, in New Orleans, the term “biomedical” (or
“Bio-Med”) has taken on an inclusive and often nebulous meaning as a targeted growth sector
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for at least the last 15 years. Likewise, for the purposes of this thesis, the term Bio-Med will
refer to an inclusive grouping of related activities as listed above. However, breaking down this
broad category is necessary to disentangle the relationship between the bifurcated social roles of
the Bio-Med industry, which provides both an economic development engine and an essential
health care infrastructure. The respective policy priorities and planning competencies involved
with supporting each of these roles fundamentally differ. For example, while a health care plan
might point to a nurses training program as enhancing capacity and quality in the health care
delivery system, an economic development plan might cite the same program as a workforce
investment. Obviously, these goals can and frequently do intersect very closely, but their
conflated representation has marked New Orleans’ approach with a measure of vagueness that
serves as a suitable entry point to critical analysis.
This thesis will examine how health care and economic development policy priorities
intersect and diverge in the post-Katrina landscape. First, however, an exploration of the specific
components of the Bio-Med sector, particularly in light of the academic and professional
literature’s definition of these categories, informs analytical assumptions regarding the industry
as an economic development project. Included within the relatively broad conception of BioMed activity in New Orleans, biotechnology stands out as a burgeoning industrial category, apart
from the older but related functions of hospitals and universities. Generally, biotechnology may
be considered emblematic of the “new economy,” in that the industry has come of age in the past
20 years, depends critically on knowledge as opposed to natural resources, and employs a highly
skilled workforce (Fitzgerald 2006, 114-115). Unmatched for research intensiveness, the U.S.
biotechnology industry spends over $9 billion in R&D annually (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 53).
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Cortright and Mayer (2002, 37-39) discuss at length how the biotechnology industry is
defined by itself and by the academics who study it. Table 1 reports Cortright and Mayer’s work
on assembling industry definitions, along with selected other relevant categories put forth in New
Orleans-specific policies documents. While neither old Standard Industrial Classification codes
(SIC) nor the new North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) neatly categorize
the biotechnology industry, the Biotechnology Industry Organization and Ernst and Young, who
maintain two of the most widely recognized counts of biotechnology firms, generally define
“biotechnology” as “the application of biological knowledge and techniques to develop products
and services” (Cortright and Mayer 2002, 37). The “biotechnology industry,” then, includes
firms established to develop this knowledge and to exploit it commercially (6). Mainly, this field
utilizes molecular, cellular, and genetic processes that can be applied to a wide range of
activities, including agriculture and manufacturing. In the majority of cases, though,
biotechnology applications involve medicine and health. While some other industry groups and
academic observers differentiate between biotechnology and pharmaceutical production and
manufacturing, their definitions regarding what constitutes biotech-related activity remain
broadly congruent (38). As listed above, according to the categories explicitly situated within
the Bio-Med sector by the BNOB plan, biotechnology firms most closely fall under “life
sciences R&D,” with the important distinction that biotech workers create knowledge for
entrepreneurial commercial development (or “applied” research) in contrast with the academic
research carried out at a university (or “basic” research).
Fitzgerald relates biotechnology to a broad industrial grouping that includes
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices (“biomanufacturing”), all of which
otherwise have been combined into a “biopharmaceutical” category of industries (Fitzgerald
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Table 1. Selected Biosciences, Biotechnology, and Life Sciences Definitions
Term

Source

Definition

Biotechnology*

Biotechnology
Industry
Organization, Ernst
and Young
Institute for
Biotechnology
Information

The application of biological knowledge and
techniques to develop products and services

Industry Definitions

Biotechnology*

Biotechnology *

Pricewaterhouse
Coopers Moneytree

Biotechnology*

Standard and
Poor’s 2000
Milken Institute
2004

Academic Definitions

Biopharmaceutical
Biotechnology*

Goetz and Morgan
1995

Biotechnology*

Hall and BagchiSen 2001

Biotechnology*

Paugh and
LaFrance 1997

Biotechnology*

Gray and Parker
1998
Fitzgerald 2006

Biomanufacturing

Firms founded to use new technologies as the
basis of the R&D or manufacturing efforts
(differentiates between pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms)
Developers of technology promoting drug
development, disease treatment, and a deeper
understanding of living organisms, including
biochemicals, cell therapy, genetic engineering
systems, drug delivery, and pharmaceuticals
(treats medical devices, health care services, and
medical information systems as separate
industries)
No specific definition (treats pharmaceutical
firms separately)
No specific definition (includes pharmaceutical
and medical device manufacturing and
biotechnology)
Any technique that uses living organisms or parts
of organisms to make/modify products, improve
plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for
specific use
Products and Processes for the diagnosis,
treatment, and cure of human disease, as well as
the development of genetically customized
animals, plants, and food
A set of techniques that use organisms or their
cellular, subcellular, or molecular components to
make products or modify plants, animals, and
micro-organisms to carry desired traits
No definition (distinguishes between
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals)
The portion of the biotechnology industry
engaged specifically in manufacturing processes
(distinguishes between biotech, pharmaceuticals,
and medical device manufacturing)
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Table 1. Continued

New Orleans Policy Definitions

Term
Bio-Med or
health care
industry

Biotechnology

Source
Bring New Orleans
Back Commission:
Economic
Redevelopment Plan
2006
Bring New Orleans
Back Commission:
Biosciences
Workgroup 2005

Life Sciences

Bring New Orleans
Back Commission:
Biosciences
Workgroup 2005

Biosciences

Bring New Orleans
Back Commission:
Biosciences
Workgroup 2005

Definition
No specific definitions (encompasses health care
services, health care insurance, life sciences
R&D, medical devices, and pharmaceutical;
pharmaceuticals includes the biotechnology
industry)
The use of cellular and molecular processes to
solve problems or make products, and
biotechnology firms use cells and biological
molecules for applications in medicine,
agriculture, and environmental management
(differentiates between biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies, contract research
organizations, and equipment manufacturers)
Life sciences firms include those that design and
produce medical devices and instruments and
pharmaceutical companies, and in some cases
may include medical labs, hospitals, and medical
centers
Incorporates life sciences and biotechnology, as
well as agricultural chemicals and research and
testing

SOURCES: Cortright and Mayer 2002(*), BRDP 2002, BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005,
BNOB 2006, Milken Institute 2004, Fitzgerald 2006.
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2006, 114; cf. Milken Institute 2004). Relatively recently, traditional pharmaceutical
manufacturers have explored linkages with newer, smaller, and more entrepreneurial biotech
firms. Indeed, many biotech and biomanufacturing firms share knowledge, access to capital,
support services, and amenities, reinforcing a widely observed tendency for such firms to
concentrate spatially. In 2003, the biotech industry employed 191,000 people in 1,457
companies nationally in relatively high-wage, high-value jobs (Fitzgerald 2006, 114). Given the
high rate of expected growth in these industries, regions with a strong biotech industrial cluster
are well positioned to attract and to retain well paying jobs as the industry continues to mature.
Consequently, nearly every state in the union counts biotechnology as an industry targeted for
economic development.
While some consensus exists regarding the industry’s definition of biotechnology, the
way in which biotechnology is defined on the state and local level often varies from place to
place. In almost all cases where states or localities have attempted to examine biotechnologyrelated activity, the definition of biotechnology is tailored to local perceptions (Cortright and
Mayer 2002, 39). Almost all of these definitions include biotechnology as defined above as well
as other activities under a wide array of other terms, including “biosciences,” “life sciences,”
“biomedical sciences,” and “health care technology” (39). On the one hand, most of these
studies exist primarily to market the locality as the site of a substantial cluster of biotech and
biotech-related activity and, as such, may be prone to inflationary definitions. On the other hand,
to some extent, the nature of relationships between actors in a given cluster probably varies from
site to site. 1

1

To illustrate, Walcott, writing separately on the Atlanta life-science (1999) industry and the San
Diego bioscience industry (2002) uses a different set of SIC codes to describe employment for
each site.
10

In New Orleans, several terms have been used. For instance, the recent BNOB plan uses
the terms “Bio-Med” and “health care industry” interchangeably and mainly addresses the status
of the downtown “health sciences district,” otherwise known as the “downtown medical
complex” (BNOB 2006, 29). Notwithstanding the use of the term in New Orleans, “biomedical”
usually is defined more restrictively as the use of life sciences for medical applications. In this
sense, a biotechnology firm may be engaged in biomedical activity by attempting to
commercialize a life science-based technology for medical applications as opposed to, for
example, food processing applications. However, in New Orleans, Bio-Med inclusively refers to
biosciences (academic research, private biotech firms, etc.) and the health care industry (health
services, insurance, etc.). Despite relying on a similar set of institutions, these sub-categories
structurally diverge in terms of industrial organization, labor, and production processes. Health
services and biosciences/biotechnology may be described more accurately as separate but related
economic activities, operating at opposite ends of a long and exceptionally complex medical
production chain. The BNOB plan reports that the Bio-Med industry supported approximately
12 percent of the area’s employment in 2004, second only to tourism and first in both revenue
($8.7 billion) and payroll ($2.7 billion); but health care services account for the vast majority –
95 percent – of Bio-Med employment. While New Orleans-Area institutions employ many
workers in biosciences and medicine-related fields, firms attempting to commercialize
biomedical technologies employ very few. Thus, as used in the BNOB plan, the Bio-Med term’s
inclusiveness may be interpreted as symptomatic of the tendency to employ inflationary
biotechnology definitions on the local level. The next chapter reviews the nature of hightechnology regions, with particular attention to the localized aspects of biotechnology
commercialization.
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II. Literature Review

A General Review of Economic Geographies of Innovative Environments
From the definitions above, life sciences and biotechnology epitomize the knowledge
economy, in contrast with more traditional industries. A large body of research within economic
geography, industrial innovation, and economic development addresses this phenomenon and
highlights two seemingly paradoxical processes at work (Gertler and Levitte 2005). On one
hand, the emphasis on knowledge, as a relatively mobile factor of production, to an extent, has
freed high-technology industries of certain geographical constraints such as hard infrastructure,
natural resources, and large pools of relatively low-skilled labor. On the other hand, the most
knowledge-intensive industries, including biotechnology, show a high degree of geographical
concentration, reflecting the persistence of a locational pull in the innovation process. This
section further explores this dynamic through a critical review of literature on the economic
geography of innovation, particularly in relation to the biotechnology and life sciences industries,
and examines how these theories are put into practice within the field of economic development.
The process of technological change provides an illustrative starting point, albeit one for
which a substantial body of literature admittedly has only produced partial understanding. The
traditional “linear model” of innovation continues to underlie most policy thinking about
technology and economic development and also serves as a theory of knowledge production
(Malecki 1991, 114; see Steinmueller 1994 for a review). Briefly, the linear model consists of a
sequential process where “basic” research produces findings, which are refined through
“applied” research, then tested during the “development” process, and finally commercialized
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through production, diffusion, and marketing. Along the way, the outputs of each stage act as
inputs for the next stage. The lesson then follows that policy-makers should quite simply strive
for an appropriate balance between basic research and applied research and that development
will follow naturally.
However, while the linear model continues to inform explanations of the link between
basic research, innovation, and economic development, many researchers have highlighted the
shortcomings of such a sterile, unidirectional, and overly simplistic process (Steinmueller 1994;
Malecki 1991, 115). In reality, innovation proceeds in a much more disorderly fashion than
purported by the linear model and varies widely by product and industry. Numerous feedbacks
exist both internally and externally to the model’s discrete stages. For example, the diffusion of
scientific knowledge may filter through institutional pathways to determine the goals, methods,
productivity, or funding sources of basic research. In other cases, inefficiencies or obstacles in
the development stage may force adjustments upstream in the applied research phase,
challenging the concept of a unidirectional route of transfer from science to technology.
Moreover, while the linear model links science with social gains, this innovation and
development process is situated geographically and socially in ways that complicate the model’s
conceptual simplicity.
More sensitive models of economic growth and development have increasingly directed
an analysis of local factors of economic growth, that is, the extent to which agglomeration
reflects a spatially embedded system of innovation. Since the early 1980s, study has isolated the
region in particular as a site of “untraded interdependencies” for an industrialized world
consisting of “Post-Fordist,” “flexibly specialized,” or “learning-based” firms (Storper 1995).
To be sure, the study of the geographical concentration of economic activity is, by no means, a
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new topic. In fact, Weber’s theory of the agglomeration of urban economic activity, Marshall’s
industrial districts, and Schumpeter’s original observation of the clustering effect have continued
to lay the theoretical basis – or at least the inspiration – for the work of many industrial
economists and economic geographers throughout the Twentieth Century. Many of these
researchers have tried to offer greater empirical understanding to Marshall’s whimsy that
“knowledge is in the air;” but while studies have documented the importance of local networks
and social interaction, the empirical mechanisms of knowledge spillovers and externalities have
not been made explicit (Feldman 2000, 389; Storper 1995). Descriptive analyses of local or
regional innovation and development processes have produced various typologies and
vocabularies – many of which are not necessarily mutually exclusive – that differ by the specific
focus of analysis and to a lesser extent by industry, by regionally specific geographical or social
characteristics, or by the individual researcher’s academic tradition and inclination.
To illustrate the diversity of approaches, Marceau (1994) identifies three such lenses for
analysis and policy formation in national economic systems, named for their central descriptive
metaphors: clusters, chains, and complexes. The clustering of innovative firms, first recognized
by Schumpeter, stresses interactions between and within related industries, usually highlighting
the process of geographic concentration at the local, regional, or national level. Many
contemporary cluster analyses follow Michael Porter’s influential brand of study, which stresses
competition between firms and only incidentally mentions geographic concentration and
productivity gains from locally driven cooperation; others follow the tradition of Marshall’s
study of industrial districts and foreground geographical concentration and cooperation between
firms (Marceau 1994, 7). In the cluster metaphor, firms relate through web-like networks of
interaction. The “chains” model, in contrast, stresses firm activities as linkages along a supply
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chain, or “input-output” system, such that innovations at any level could have consequences
upstream or downstream in the production process. Finally, the “complexes” metaphor seeks a
more holistic account of cooperation between four major groups of actors: producers (firms),
public-sector research organizations, users (consumers or other firms), and regulators
(governments and mediating organizations of all levels) (9). This approach considers
government in an active role in innovation policy and research funding, and applies especially
well to innovative activities with a public welfare component, like health care (10). Ultimately,
while none of these lenses offers a total view of the economy, each is a necessary supplement to
cruder neo-classical views on industrial competitiveness.
These national systems have regional and local analogs, where more individualized
spatial relationships take precedence over national- and international-level trade and regulatory
structures. Theoretical work has highlighted the salience of such concepts as an “innovative
milieu” acting as essential infrastructure for innovation, and the most widely cited regional
archetypes include Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in Boston, Baden-Wurttemburg in
Southern Germany, and Emilia-Romagna in Northern Italy, among others, where small- or
medium-sized firms have played an integral role in regional economic success (Cooke and
Morgan 1994, 25). This literature stresses collaboration between firms (often in the form of
“untraded interdependencies”), knowledge spillovers (mainly through the often nebulous concept
of “networks”), and the importance of a “soft infrastructure” of institutional support for business
innovation from the public sector, the private sector, or public-private partnerships (Storper
1995; Cooke and Morgan 1994, 31).
The literature on the socio-political structures of innovation and economic growth
seemingly varies almost as much as national, regional, and local systems of innovation
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themselves. Likewise, there is some variation across attempts to list the necessary “ingredients”
of an innovative, entrepreneurial, or “creative” region. Malecki (1991, 330-334) reviews several
such lists, most of which include some combination of the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

venture capital availability,
the presence of experienced entrepreneurs and a cultural atmosphere for
entrepreneurialism,
a technically skilled labor force,
accessibility to suppliers and new markets,
favorable government policies and regulations,
attractive living conditions,
availability of land,
adequate transportation and other hard infrastructures,
proximity to universities, and
supportive institutions.

Of course, several of these “ingredients” are common to most, if not all, large urban areas. Other
analyses have added geographical characteristics of agglomerations, including less quantifiable
factors like the level of instability and uncertainty in the local economy and the diversification of
economic activity. Finally, quality of life factors increasingly are seen as necessary for attracting
and maintaining the more mobile ingredients of an entrepreneurial region, such as knowledge
and skilled labor, to feed the more locally embedded qualities, such as the entrepreneurial
climate and institutional support. Florida’s (2002) writings on the “creative class,” perhaps the
most famous statement on the link between quality and diversity of life styles and economic
growth, have achieved a rare level of acceptance among mainstream policymakers in the United
States. On the whole, however, while these lists may provide useful analytical taxonomies,
entrepreneurial environments are too complex to reduce to a few simple variables for
manipulation through policy, especially when accounting for regional variation (Malecki 1991,
334). Despite a persistent lack of empirical clarity, the mechanisms of regional innovative
milieus are site-specific and path dependant, and often determined by national and international
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(i.e., non-local) determinants. Somewhat paradoxically, even as local and regional factors have
increasingly been subjected to study, contemporary globalized trade and finance networks have
left technology systems vulnerable to increasingly footloose factors of knowledge and capital,
counterbalancing the importance of an embedded milieu (Gertler and Levitte 2005).
As noted above, a diversity of scholarship on regional innovation and entrepreneurialism
has analyzed the phenomenon of geographically concentrated economic activities. Lately, this
academic knowledge filters to policymakers primarily through a clusters approach and most
commonly through Michael Porter’s particular “brand,” as popularized by his influential research
and his leadership of the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness. Indeed, since the 1990s,
Porter’s work has become de rigueur in the rhetoric of mainstream economic development,
particularly where economic theory underlies policy decisions that direct the investment of
public and private funds. In policy documents concerning New Orleans’ life sciences industry,
Porter’s theory is the only theoretical work cited; therefore, a closer examination of his model of
clusters and competitive advantage is merited. Porter defines a cluster as “a geographically
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field,
linked by commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 2000, 254). The geographical scope of
such clusters may range from a single city to a group of neighboring countries, depending on the
strength of “spillovers” among a host of related firms, infrastructure providers, training and
technical support institutions, regulatory agencies, and trade associations (254-255). In Porter’s
dynamic formulation, clusters influence competitive advantage in three broad ways: by
increasing the static productivity of constituent firms or industries (e.g., through access to
specialized inputs and labor, access to information and knowledge, complementarities, access to
institutions and public goods, and through incentives and performance measurement), by
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increasing a firm’s capacity for innovation and thus for productivity growth, and finally by
stimulating new business formation that supports innovation and expands the cluster (Porter
2000, 259). A “diamond” metaphor, now shorthand for Porter’s model, stresses interactions
between four sources of local competitive advantage: factor (input) conditions, demand
conditions, related and supporting industries, and the context for firm strategy and rivalry (Porter
1998, 166-167). Porter has liberally applied this model, ranging from national systems of
innovation (see The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990) to the potential for inner city
redevelopment (see “New Strategies for Inner City Economic Development,” 1997).
Despite a long international tradition of study and policy based around the concept of
agglomeration’s role in innovation and economic growth, Porter’s cluster model has transformed
into a mantra for economic development, often carrying with it the enticement of novelty, such
that Glasmeier (2000, 562) identifies Porter’s influence as a “Fourth Wave” of economic
development practice, even supplanting the third phase’s primary emphasis on public-private
partnerships. Many of these ideas concerning geographical influences on innovation and growth,
of course, are as old as the fields of economics and economic geography themselves. Newlands
(2003), for example, identifies five different theoretical traditions drawn upon by contemporary
literature: standard agglomeration theory (from Marshall onwards); transaction costs (the
“California School”); flexible specialization, trust, and untraded interdependencies; innovative
milieu (the GREMI Group); and institutional and evolutionary economics. Benneworth and
Henry (2003) add Porter to this list – notwithstanding the disputed originality of his contributions
– since his research has so frequently appeared as a novel touchstone for public policy, ironically
even as his work downplays active participation by the public sector. While Porter’s model
likely owes some of its popularity to its coincidental appearance and theoretical parallels with
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neo-liberal deregulation processes, some of the approach’s novelty derives from the conceptual
blending of the cluster model. That is, while economic geographers generally view the cluster as
horizontally integrated innovation network, or as a system of non-traded interdependencies like
trust, geographical economists embark on the assumption that clusters represent an
agglomeration of economic activity, enhancing local competitive advantage in a liberal growth
model. In fact, this difference has caused some antagonism between opposing sides of the
debate (Benneworth et al. 2003, 515). Porter, however, stresses the perspective of the private
sector and its competitive logic, perhaps an artifact of his strategic management background and
his earlier work on international competitiveness. Additionally, Porter’s diamond model is
exceptionally malleable both in its scale, having been applied to analyses of neighborhoods and
international systems of production alike, and in its terminology, into which almost any
economic activity could fit as evidence of a cluster.
To some extent, policymakers have applied Porter’s model to legitimate traditional
sectoral strategies. With empirical definitions of clusters, their interior workings, and their
geographical scales and boundaries still unsettled, the concept lends itself to industrial targeting
and locality promotion – the presence of nearly any firm could be molded into a potential or
existing competitive advantage in the cluster model. At the very least, cluster policies in practice
include a variety of different and, in many cases, imprecisely defined approaches that are largely,
if not primarily, determined through the political process.
Glameier (2000) highlights several problems with the recent renewed interest in clusters.
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is its proponent’s failure to account for the importance of
economic diversity in an innovative region. This boils down to two different types of economic
agglomeration on which Porter’s model lacks clarity: “localization,” the clustering of related
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firms for benefits derived from proximity, shared labor pools, etc., and “urbanization,” the
mutual gains to productivity arising from a broad mix of proximally located economic activities
across industries and sectors. Glasmeier (2000, 566) cites a notable body of research to contend
that innovation and economic growth derive unambiguously from a locale’s urbanization and
only in limited cases from a sectorally narrower industrial specialization. In other words, some
localities might simply lack the critical economic mass and diversity necessary to support a selfreinforcing innovative cluster with wide-ranging economic impacts (Malecki 1991, 313-314).
In addition to concerns with the shortcomings of Porter’s model, some have criticized the
centrality of the private sector in his discourse. In particular, his popular article “New Strategies
for Inner City Economic Development” (1997) has been criticized as the newest example of
“gilding the ghetto,” as if simply improving neighborhood business climates and decreasing the
role of the public sector will expose latent competitive advantage and help to alleviate the
structural causes of persistent poverty. Harrison and Glasmeier (1997), Blakely and Small
(1997), and Fainstein and Gray (1997) have convincingly responded that the private sector alone,
acting through a cluster model, will not alleviate urban poverty and that the public sector must
play a more active role in theory and strategy. Still others have criticized the very validity of the
cluster approach, mainly citing its misappropriation in practice. To some extent, the academic
resurgence of the regional cluster, as epitomized by the popularity of Porter’s particular brand,
has merely translated into rhetoric for locality promotion and a new patina for older industrial
retention and recruitment policies in economic development practice. Despite a lack of clarity
regarding the geographic scale, interior workings, and role of policy in industrial clusters and an
abundance of evidence to validate the importance of economic diversity and path dependence,
policymakers have accepted the assumption that technology-based economic development is
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largely determined by a vague clustering effect. Consequently, economic development
professionals and policymakers have routinely sought to promote the indigenous potential of
their constituent regions to produce or to adapt innovations to commercial uses and have shaped
the public sector’s role into one of a catalyst or facilitator in attracting, creating, and retaining
high technology firms. In this sense, the attractiveness of high-tech industries and the popularity
of Porter’s pliable, private-sector-centric model have converged to substantiate a trendy rhetoric
for sectoral strategies. Blakely and Nishikawa (1992, 241) write,
In their attempts to formulate new roles and missions, state government leaders have
evoked attractive images and metaphors based on the experiences of Silicon Valley and
Boston’s Route 128. The language used in policy discourse often blurs the distinction
between description and prescription. Policy concepts, embedded in high-technology
success stories, are repeated and diffused through professional networks and the popular
media.
Yet, despite the attractiveness and adaptability of the image of a high-tech cluster, a long
tradition of cluster studies, contrary to the optimistic possibilism of recent iterations (i.e., Porter),
suggests that the capacity for indigenous systems to attain innovation-led economic growth from
a narrow sectoral specialization is unlikely for the vast majority of regions and localities. Martin
and Sunley (2003), in particular, see little more than a powerful and often poorly
misappropriated “brand” in the concept of clusters, for which Porter is a gatekeeper, eclipsing the
work of other economic geographers and established theories in the policy arena. Benneworth
and Henry (2003) answer this criticism by highlighting the diversity of cluster studies beyond
Porter’s influence and the potential for interaction between diverse, even unsettled theoretical
positions. In particular, they draw on Barnes’s description of the recent phase of “hermeneutic”
economic geography that is open-ended, reflexive, catholic in its theoretical sources, and selfconsciously perspectival and partial (Barnes 2001, 561). Given some rigor with respect to
recognizing the multiplicity of theoretical traditions, “the value added of the clusters approach
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(drawing on hermeneutic theorizing) lies in, first, allowing for and explicitly promoting these
theoretical conversations and, secondly, the potential this may afford in which multiple
explanations can interact conceptually to provide a richer understanding of the situation than
permitted by theoretically monistic approaches” (Benneworth and Henry 2003, 1018). It is from
this perspective that the following account of biotechnology in New Orleans brings a variety of
sources to bear on the Bio-Med “cluster” as the unit of analysis – even if this use of the term is
open to interpretation. The analysis is somewhat purposefully open-ended and complex, as is the
situation itself, determined by factors relating to the regional health care system as well as to
local milieu. Before considering New Orleans, however, a review of biotechnology experiences
in other regions offers a basis for comparison.

Comparative Case Studies of Bioscience Clusters
Preceding sections have floated working definitions and descriptions of the
biotechnology industry and have discussed broad trends in research on – and strategic
implementations of – technology-driven local systems of economic development. This section
combines these themes into a review of existing case studies for biotechnology clusters, with the
aim to draw out industry-specific determinants of successful development. To an extent, this
attempt draws more heavily from economic development literature, which views biotechnology
in particular as an increasingly enticing target for local growth efforts, as opposed to economic
geography, which often – perhaps to a fault – lumps biotechnology together with other
knowledge-intensive activities in a more generic model of flexible-specialization. 2 Of course,
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This claim is not without exception. Walcott’s (1999; 2002) work, in particular, exemplifies an
attempt to bridge the divide between theory-oriented economic geographers observing
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these perspectives are related: the biotechnology industry is maturing, and as a course in its
“life-cycle,” its expansion and codification of products and processes will rearrange the diffusion
of benefits to participating localities. In this sense, biotechnology appears to have the
characteristic of a new “core technology,” with the potential to underpin a new paradigm of
development (Gertler and Levitte 2005); and state and local policymakers view increasing or
maintaining participation in this process as an attractive possibility, even while literature specific
to the locational needs of biotechnology firms remains insufficient (Walcott 1999, 48).
In a broad snapshot of the biotechnology industry, Cortright and Mayer (2002, 3) note a
high degree of concentration: 9 of the nation’s 51 largest metropolitan areas house three quarters
of the largest biotech firms, and only four of these account for the majority of recent growth
(Fitzgerald 2006, 115). While NIH funding for basic research and biotech patents has dispersed
in recent decades, the private financing system has become increasingly concentrated within the
top tier of biotech regions, which “account for 88 percent of all venture capital for
biopharmaceuticals, 92 percent of the most active biotechnology venture capital firms, and 96
percent of the dollar value of research alliances with pharmaceutical firms” (Cortright and Mayer
2002, 33-34). Further below in the biotechnology hierarchy, 28 metropolitan areas, including
New Orleans, contain some significant biotechnology research and commercialization but at
levels well below the top-heavy average of the entire group. The authors refer to these areas as
“median” metropolitan areas, and the most intense competition to emerge as a nascent
biotechnology center is most likely to take place here.
The major biotechnology “core” areas have several features in common, which may be
interpreted as likely preconditions for successful development. Broadly, these biotech centers

biotechnology development after-the-fact and practice-oriented economic development scholars
attempting to build best practices for influencing biotechnology development ex ante.
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share two key characteristics of a strong research capacity and the ability to convert research into
successful commercial activity through access to capital and a developed entrepreneurial climate
(Cortright and Mayer 2002, 3). Still, some variation exists within the top tier. While carving the
mold for American high-technology development in general, Boston and San Francisco have led
the biotechnology industry since its inception in the 1970s. The Philadelphia and New York
metropolitan areas have historically housed headquarters for the nations largest pharmaceutical
manufacturers. The Washington-Baltimore area contains a significant biomedical research
establishment, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The Los Angeles area houses
the nation’s largest biotech firm, Amgen. Newer entrants San Diego, Seattle, and RaleighDurham have built upon the local assets of a well recognized, well-funded research
establishment and a climate favorable to start-up firms. These three newcomer regions, together
with Boston and San Francisco, account for the vast majority of growth in new biotech firms
(Cortright and Mayer 2002, 3). As a whole, these exemplary areas share not only proximity to
pre-commercial research institutions like universities but also the financial and entrepreneurial
conditions required to sustain the large level of private investment necessary to adapt basic
research into marketable products.
The top tier group expectedly accounts for the focus of the majority of existing biotech
literature, and several relevant case studies highlight certain aspects of biotechnology-based
development in specific regions or localities. Walcott (2002) uses San Diego’s bioscience
cluster to illustrate the dynamics underlying the construction of an innovative environment. 3 Her
interviews with local industry professionals reveal five key factors underlying regional success:
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In reference to the earlier discussion of unfixed terminology in life sciences-related industries,
Walcott focuses on biopharmaceutical and medical device firms, which she terms “bioscience”
firms, as opposed to, for example, bioagricultural firms (2002, 99).
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access to an outstanding research university, advocacy leadership, risk financing, and
entrepreneurial culture, and appropriate real estate for each stage in a firm’s growth, preferably
in proximity to related university research activity. Her narrative of San Diego’s emergence as
“Bioscience Beach” stresses the strong interpersonal component of knowledge networks as well
as the importance of a role model firm, Hybritech, originally a tech-transfer project from the
University of California, San Diego, that capitalized on a broad convergence between the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries during the 80s. In an excellent example of the
development of a local entrepreneurial milieu, wealthy Hybritech employees helped to spin off
numerous additional companies, forming a core of local venture capitalist “angels” eager to stay
in an area attractive for both life-style and professional reasons through self-reinforcing cluster
activities (105). Rather than relying on firms and labor from outside, San Diego’s bioscience
cluster was able to generate its own skilled labor and knowledge flows from local universities
and research institutions like Scripps Research Institute, helping to allow the creation of smaller,
locally embedded enterprises instead of attracting established firms from outside. Active
advocacy and leadership, most notably the often-emulated industrial organization CONNECT,
also played as key role, both through nurturing new and existing firms and through lobbying
governments at all levels.
Huag and Ness (1993) investigate industrial location decisions for biotech firms by
surveying industry executives in the Seattle area. They conclude that R&D and manufacturing
facility locations emphasize founder preferences, proximity to university or company facilities,
labor agglomeration economies, and local infrastructure, with manufacturing facilities
particularly displaying a greater concern for land and labor costs. Local regulations and taxes
add additional wrinkles to the complex importance of proximity for R&D and manufacturing
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activities. Factors accounting for Seattle’s success include strong federal research funding at the
University of Washington, a local entrepreneurial climate to actively nurture small enterprises
and spin-off firms, an a priori concentration of numerous other high-tech firms (e.g., Microsoft,
Boeing) to condition access to knowledge and labor, and the presence of several successful “role
model” biotech firms. Interestingly, Huag and Ness note that the Seattle cluster, like most other
biotech centers, developed without significantly organized and comprehensive biotech-specific
efforts on the part of university or state agencies (399). Nonetheless, they recommend that, to
implement viable strategies for biotech development, state and local governments should
increase the availability of venture capital funding, support scientific and technical education
programs, assist in obtaining federal university research funding, maintain consistency in
regulatory policies, develop efficient and effective technology transfer systems, and, possibly,
establish incubator or scientific support facilities. The authors also discount the effectiveness of
incentives, subsidies, tax concessions, and low-interest loans for attracting new industry (399).
Feldman and Francis’s (2003) description of the rise of Maryland’s biotech cluster
emphasizes the role of public investment and existing strengths in life sciences research and
talent around the Capitol Region as enabling factors for entrepreneurialism in the innovative
milieu. Proximity to universities (Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland) and government
departments (the NIH and FDA) and their attendant research laboratories aid the cluster by
anchoring personnel movements, technology licensing, and collaborative research agreements
(770-771). The state has kept pace with a national trend by constructing 11 business incubators,
some including crucial wet-lab space for biotech as well as firm consulting, ancillary business
services, and infrastructure (773). Like other regions, Maryland has an active non-profit industry
organization, MdBio, to aid in funding and cluster promotion (773). Maryland’s biotech
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emergence is notable because public-sector employment has historically dominated the Capitol
Area in an economic system generally not considered exceptionally conducive to innovative or
entrepreneurial activity. Feldman and Francis describe the transformation as a result of a threestage process: federal-level economic restructuring and policy changes to favor biotechnology
enterprises, 4 increased local entrepreneurial competency for start-ups in a region lacking a more
traditional large corporation, and a fully functioning entrepreneurial environment within an
innovative and adaptable industrial cluster. Beyond state- and local-level cluster policy, this
particular narrative is deeply tied to exogenous forces and to the unique characteristics of the
Capitol Region, mainly government laboratories and universities and their respective pools of
skilled labor. In Feldman and Francis’ estimation, cluster policies such as incubators, incentives,
and funding initiatives lagged behind rather than led entrepreneurial engagement with an existing
concentration of biosciences-related activity. Overall, the Maryland experience provides a
significant challenge to a one-size-fits-all policy for building an innovative cluster without a
strong tradition of entrepreneurialism.
Acs, Herron, and Sapienza (1992) hone in on the financing component of Maryland’s
biotechnology industry, primarily centered on the Baltimore-Washington Region. Through firm
surveys, they find that the majority of Maryland’s biotech firms import capital mainly from New
York and New England, implying that Maryland’s significant biotech cluster lacks the local
venture capital networks present in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (381). Despite the Baltimore
Area’s research and institutional strengths, a gap exists between local venture capital community
and the financial needs of early-stage and start-up firms, hindering the effectiveness of other
4

In this case, the federal government’s role included setting a national research agenda with
broad funding distributed through laboratories and grants, and establishing regulations and
standards for the industry as a whole (Feldman and Francis 2003, 785). The Capitol Region was
particularly well-positioned to take advantage of these changes.
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strategic interventions, such as incubators and shared facilities to promote technology-based
development. 5 Gertler and Levitte (2005) offer similar findings for Canadian biotech firms,
which they cite as evidence to destabilize the recent literature’s emphasis on the importance of
local networks of capital and information flows vis a vis global networks. These non-local flows
may simply reflect biotechnology’s maturity as an industry and its need to expand relationships
beyond the nursery of a local innovative milieu; but in any case, a successful biotech region
likely must be open to inter-regional and even inter-national flows of knowledge and capital.
Even within a given region, there exists a diversity of experiences. Fitzgerald and Leigh
(2002) use New Haven’s attempt to build a Bioscience Cluster to capitalize on Yale’s research
strength as an example of technology-led sectoral strategies. Despite being located within the
New York region, 6 the state, the city, and the university were relative latecomers in targeting
biotechnology. Part of New Haven’s success followed from a change in leadership at Yale in the
early 1990s, when the university began to actively sponsor university biomedical programs
aimed at creating a cluster that would mutually benefit New Haven’s economic development and
the university’s research agenda (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 54). Along with a state-level
adoption of Porter-influenced initiatives, a non-profit oversight corporation, Connecticut United
for Research Excellence, Inc. (CURE), facilitates information exchange and communication
among Bioscience Cluster members and publicizes and markets the cluster’s contributions.
CURE has also been successful in lobbying for favorable tax incentives for research and biotech
start-ups and for streamlining permits. Meanwhile, the state has provided successful gap capital
5

Feldman and Francis’ (2003) later study on Maryland, while not focusing discretely on venture
capital, mentioned the region’s relative lack of seed funding as a continuing weakness when
compared with other top biotech clusters.
6
New Haven is located within the top-tier New York Region as Cortright and Mayer (2002)
define it, following the census New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA
CMSA.
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funds for the fixed costs (e.g., lab and office space) of startups, since venture capitalists are much
more likely to finance research and development costs (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 57). The city
has taken a facilitator role through marketing, investments aimed at improving quality-of-life,
strategic real estate development (including business incubators and brownfield redevelopment),
and regulations. Private real estate investors and biotechnology companies have followed with
their own investments in laboratory and office space. Fitzgerald and Leigh, however, note a
weak link in the New Haven cluster strategy: workforce development at the state and local
levels (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 62). While experts predict future labor shortages as demand
for biotech labor grows, many of these positions require only community college training rather
than college degrees. However, Connecticut has made little effort to offer relevant associates
degree programs, and biotechnology firms remain skeptical that workers with only associate’s
degrees could fill their positions (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 62). Another criticism addresses
distributional issues. High-technology sectoral strategies create mostly high-wage, high-skill
jobs and benefit only a narrow range of occupations (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 64). The
venture capital, real estate needs, and infrastructural investments of biotech strategies, such as
business incubators and lab space, require a particularly high rate of subsidy per directly created
job. In a sense, Connecticut’s sectoral initiatives have replaced an older corporate-subsidy
approach to economic development, where benefits are expected to trickle down through
economic multipliers (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 65).
Moving further from the core biotech regions, Walcott (1999) explores spatial aspects of
the biomedical industry in and around Atlanta, which remains underdeveloped as an innovative
milieu despite the region’s steady growth since the 1980s. Her surveys and interviews reveal the
primacy of “personal real estate factors” (roughly comparable to quality of life concerns) over
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place-based innovation characteristics or inter-firm linkages as priorities for firm location
decisions. As such, endogenous agglomeration advantages such as knowledge spillovers are
apparent, but their contribution to the broader local accumulation of knowledge is muted (67).
Biotech agglomerations thus have paralleled the proliferation of “technoburbs” in the Atlanta
region (Fishman 1987) and the restructuring of medical laboratories and hospitals to
accommodate the demands of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (Walcott 1999, 66-67),
and have been crucial for attracting skilled technical and management talent. Atlanta certainly
offers regional strengths as a growing area with an established presence of a skilled workforce,
ample hard infrastructure, and life sciences-related institutions like the CDC. 7 However, Walcott
concludes that no shortage of structural “pull” factors nor a prevalence of less favorable “push”
factors hinder development of an innovative milieu; rather, a lack of agency, such as a key
networking individual or mediating organization, critically retards the biomedical cluster’s
emergence into regional growth engine.
Fitzgerald (2006) focuses on career ladders and workforce development in core
biotechnology regions. Tailoring her focus around the more labor-intensive biomanufacturing
processes, her review reveals successes in matching community college programs with demand
for biotech labor, especially for lab-tech positions requiring only a two-year degree. However,
Fitzgerald (2006, 115) warns that only the largest biotech centers are best positioned to capture
growth on the manufacturing end, as proximity to R&D and path dependence involved with
permitting new plants hedge growth in the years ahead. Furthermore, biotech firms are, by
nature, high-risk, high-reward operations. Only about 20 percent of drugs in early trials ever
make it to market, and only about 30 percent of these produce profits higher than the cost of

7

Interestingly, Coca-Cola was instrumental in luring the CDC to Atlanta (Walcott 1999, 62).
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R&D, which in most cases runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars (115). Fitzgerald
succinctly and convincingly expresses a case for tempered optimism regarding the potential for
biotech growth in marginal areas:
In brief, states that court the biotech industry – job-training programs, tax abatements,
venture capital, and other incentives to reduce a new company’s start-up costs – are
taking a big risk. And, in most cases, it probably is not a smart one (115).
Even successful biotech strategies, such as business incubators, utilize a high rate of subsidy per
directly created job (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002). Moreover, biotech firms, by nature, seek a
flexible approach to maximizing profits through partnerships with universities and especially
with large pharmaceutical firms from outside of the region – a complex and footloose
interregional economic geography. Most of these small firms have little interest in growing into
the size of incumbent biotechnology firms. Consequently, much of the benefit from local
policies aimed at improving the entrepreneurial climate, such as business incubators and
subsidies, accrues elsewhere, mainly in the top tier of biotechnology regions.
Most successful biotechnology commercialization, perhaps one out of one thousand
patented innovations, may require a decade of development (Cortright and Mayer 2002, 4).
Moreover, even in established biotechnology centers, the overall size of the biotechnology sector
is relatively small when compared with the overall regional economy. For the nine leading
biotechnology centers, pharmaceutical manufacturing employment accounts for only 3.5 percent
of total manufacturing employment (35). While economic developers in wide range of regions
gaze longingly on a biotechnology as an industry poised to explode, the expected aggregate
growth realistically will not drive significant local activity in the vast majority of cases.
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III. Building a Bio-Med Cluster in New Orleans
The preceding sections have offered standard definitions for biosciences- and
biotechnology-related terms, discussions of the geography of innovative regions in general, and
comparative case studies of biotechnology-oriented economic development. This section applies
these concepts to New Orleans, with the goal of critically assessing the region’s attempts to
cultivate biotechnology and the various economic, political, and geographic constraints on this
possibility. First, a snapshot of New Orleans’ Bio-Med industries before Katrina highlights the
city’s assets and strategies leading up to the massive upheaval of late 2005. Next, a brief
summary of various planning efforts since the storm suggests new challenges and opportunities
for planning biosciences as an economic development project. This planning process, however,
is primarily characterized by a host of other, more immediate considerations in a political system
primarily charged with managing several massive recovery and rebuilding projects.
Restructuring the regional health care system, itself the subject of a major planning effort, is only
one of these other projects, but its trajectory has critical implications for the biosciences industry,
since many of the same educational and research institutions serve as lynchpins of the regional
potential for biotechnology competitiveness. The concluding section speculates on the decisionmaking process as it relates to biosciences and health care in the post-Katrina environment and
the implications for economic development policy.
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Pre-Katrina Attempts to Capitalize on the University Research Base
Biosciences-related Universities and Institutions
Prior to Katrina, New Orleans’ main biosciences strength lay in the value of research
conducted at local universities. Awards from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are
generally regarded as a benchmark figure for publicly funded biotech-related research activity,
and higher levels generally suggest greater opportunities for commercial ventures and
partnerships involving private biotech firms. In 2002, the metro area’s $77.3 million in NIH
funding placed the region 48th in the country (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 35).
According to the BNOB plan (2006, 30), in 2003, federal and private grant funding for New
Orleans bioscience institutions exceeded $180 million and showed substantial growth in recent
years. An earlier plan placed the value of research performed at Tulane University Health
Sciences Center HSC, Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC), and the
University of New Orleans (UNO) at $232 million, which includes substantial biomedical
initiatives in gene therapy, neuroscience, cancer, ophthalmology, peptides, biology, conservation
biology, and assisted reproductive technology (BRDP 2002, 15). In fiscal year 2005, the New
Orleans Area accounted for $129.8 million in awards from the NIH, representing 74 percent of
the total amount awarded within the entire state of Louisiana (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup
2005, 11). These high figures generally have kept pace with a national trend toward increasing
research funding in the health sciences.
Tulane University and Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, New Orleans,
received the vast majority of NIH research funding, at $71 million and $41 million, respectively,
in 2005 (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 11). The inclusion of other program revenue
funds increases these totals to over $100 million for each institution. Both universities have a
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substantial presence in the New Orleans CBD, where various medical educational, research, and
clinical facilities operated by each school anchor the downtown medical district (see Figure 1).
These facilities are key components of the regional and, when accounting for their role in
training Louisiana’s health workforce, statewide health care systems. LSUHSC trains 70 percent
of the state’s health care professionals in a variety of disciplines and manages the state’s unique
network of eight public hospitals, otherwise known as the Charity System. To promote
economic development, to attract faculty with licensing opportunities, and to generate revenue,
Tulane entered the intellectual property field in 1985, and LSU organized its own Office of
Technology Development in 2000. These offices handle patent applications and licensing for
intellectual property generated within the institutions. Both offices have forged successful
partnerships and joint ventures with local and national firms, local hospitals, and other research
organizations. In FY 2003, Tulane was 21st among all U.S. universities – and 10th among private
universities – in royalty and licensing fees with $11 million (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup
2005, 14).
Xavier University and the University of New Orleans account for the majority of the
balance of local NIH funding to universities. 8 Xavier’s clinical and research faculty numbered
200 before Katrina, and this group accounted for approximately $8 million in NIH funding
annually and another $16 million in sponsored program research funding (BNOB Biosciences
Workgroup 2005, 17). Major programs include one of the nation’s most successful pharmacy
schools 9 and the Center for Bioenvironmental Research, a partnership with Tulane University.

8

Other recipients of major NIH funding include Children’s Hospital, Ochsner Regional Medical
Center, Dillard University, and two private bioscience firms.
9
A historically black university, Xavier holds one of only seven pharmacy schools in the Deep
South. The highly competitive school produces 25 percent of the nation’s African American
pharmacists.
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Figure 1. The Bio-Med Industry of Greater New Orleans

SOURCES: BDRP 2002 (Medical Complex), BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005
(Biotechnology Firms), NOLA Dashboard (hospital locations); NOTE: Out of 16 separate
addresses listed, 13 were mappable as firm locations, with two firms located in St. Tammany
Parish (not shown).
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The University of New Orleans employed 45 researchers in bioscience-related fields, accounting
for approximately $5 million in NIH funding in addition to $35 million in other sponsored
program related revenue. In recent years, UNO has been increasingly active in projects to
promote technology transfer and entrepreneurialism. UNO’s Office of Technology Transfer
resides in the UNO Research and Technology Foundation. UNO also holds a formal research
affiliation with Children’s Hospital through the Bioinformatics Center.

Biotechnology-related Economic Development Initiatives
This critical mass of universities and related institutions and, more directly, the highskilled workforce and life sciences research generated within has been touted as a basis for
growth, a regional strength unmatched throughout the Mid-South (BRDP 2002; BNOB 2006,
31). Consequently, many of the state’s strategic interventions in biosciences-related economic
development have sought to directly enhance the ability of universities to attract top researchers
while boosting the hard and soft infrastructures required to gain research funding. Malecki
(1991, 305) lists three economically beneficial outcomes from university enhancement policies:
research findings lead to scientific innovations and general technological advancement, the
development of a center of excellence in a certain field can enhance a favorable public image,
and training provides a pool of labor which can be important to regional recruiting. While this
may be sound educational policy, despite a few exemplary stories of local high-tech industries
growing in tandem with universities, to expect innovative firms to cluster around knowledge
centers is unrealistic (306). Fitzgerald and Leigh (2002, 54) agree that the presence of a major
research university is a necessary but not sufficient component of biotechnology sectoral
strategies. The variety of case studies presented earlier certainly portrays much more complex
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forces at work in innovative regions. As discussed earlier, university enhancement strategies
hearken back to the linear model of innovation, containing little direct concern for the various
geographical components of clusters, such as spillover effects, competition and
complementarities, or innovative milieus. As recounted below, the most distinctly geographical
concern running through recent biosciences policy has been to improve the downtown medical
district, which houses LSUHSC, Tulane HSC, the Department of Veterans Affairs Hospital,
Charity Hospital, Delgado Community College – Charity School of Nursing, and several other
medical and research institutions.
Louisiana’s attempt to promote the region’s attractiveness for biotech development may
be traced back at least to the mid 1980s (Economic Development Council 1985). State and local
plans have always touted the region’s strength in research and talent, highlighting the downtown
concentration of research, education, and medical facilities in downtown New Orleans anchored
by LSU and Tulane’s Health Sciences Centers. Prior to Katrina, two groups served in an
organizational role within the downtown Bio-Med district for economic development purposes.
The New Orleans Medical Complex, Inc. (NOrMC) – a private, 501 (c)(3) non-profit corporation
that has organized and planned shared infrastructure and collaborative efforts among institutions
with a stake in New Orleans’ Bio-Med activities – shared similar member institutions and
geographical boundaries with the Louisiana Biomedical Research and Development Park
(BRDP), a commission established in 1991 by the state legislature to improve health care, to
create jobs, and to encourage outside research investment (BRDP 2002). According to the
BDRP’s (2002) 10-year plan update, NOrMC has a proven history of successful project
management. NOrMC’s member institutions generated more than $2.2 billion and 23,900 jobs
through construction activities alone between 1992 and 2002 (BDRP 2002, 15). The BDRP, on
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the other hand, remained largely inactive over the same period, with the notable exception of
producing two planning documents. After the original planning phase and the establishment of
the BDRP Commission in 1992, little implementation occurred in the next ten years, mainly due
to a lack of funding (BDRP 2002, 8). The legislature provided substantial tax incentives, but it
failed to appropriate funds to market and construct state-of-the-art facilities or to subsidize
tenants’ rent, access to venture capital, and incubator operating costs. Additionally, the state’s
mid-1990s Medicaid crisis, along with a looming general fund shortfall, necessitated
restructuring and reorganization among BRDP member institutions and curtailed construction
projects (BRDP 2002, 9). In the first decade, tax credits alone did not prove sufficient to attract
firms and capital investment to the cluster.
Despite these challenges, several trends reinforced continuing optimism regarding the
competitiveness of BRDP member institutions. Anchored by Tulane and LSU Health Sciences
Centers, BRDP institutions have performed increasingly well with respect to the value of current
contracted research (well over $200 million) and the quantity of invention disclosures
(approximately 100 in 2002) – success unmatched throughout most of the South (BRDP 2002,
15). The BRDP plan cites the success and popularity of similar initiatives in other cities and
states and repeatedly warns against losing competitive advantage through inaction (BRDP 2002,
16, 19). 10 A state-level plan for three wet-lab business incubators cites the existence of similar
programs in 18 states (BDRP 2002 Appendix 4). Emphasizing that the presence of a local
research university is simply not enough to offset shortcomings in entrepreneurial climate or
venture capitalism, Malecki (1991, 344) hints at the limitations of New Orleans’ relatively late
10

The 1992 comprehensive plan utilized a multiplier of greater than three to project the ripple
effects of direct spending and employment of BDRP member institutions (BDRP 2002, 8). The
2002 update report also uses downward multiplier adjustments as evidence of the New Orleans
Region’s loss of economic diversity and, thus, the urgency of funding for cluster initiatives.
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attempt to join the trend of encouraging spin-off biotech firms. To counter these shortcomings,
incubator facilities address the capital risks of new companies and, given strict oversight by
governing bodies, can dramatically improve a local entrepreneurship (349). While regional and
local policies may struggle to generate high-tech entrepreneurship, incubators and capital pools
may encourage entrepreneurs to stay in the area or, to a lesser extent, may attract firms from
outside of the region. In fact, the state’s biosciences incubator plan proudly cites evidence from
the National Business Incubator Association, which shows that while only 20 percent of all
business start-ups survive past two years, over 80 percent of businesses beginning operations in
an incubator survive to “graduate” from the incubator and remain in the area. Additionally, the
BDRP (2002, 29) plan lists six factors to foster such entrepreneurialism: quality building space
with adequate capacity, shared experience and consultation, access to venture capital, improved
access to specialized equipment, management support services, and real estate tax incentives.
The first five are addressed in part by the proposed wet-lab business incubator; the last, by the
BDRP/NOrMC’s ability to lease land and by state tax credits currently offered to start-ups
locating in research parks.
In its plea for greater funding commitment from the state, the BRDP plan situates the
biomedical cluster within former Governor Foster’s Louisiana: Vision 2020 comprehensive plan
for economic development, specifically within the context of its goals for economic
diversification through technology (Economic Development Council 2003). Vision 2020 makes
heavy reference to the cluster model, echoed by the BRDP’s attempt to align within the state’s
more recently drafted economic development plan: “The action component of a cluster strategy
dramatically increases the communication between these various participants, in order to greatly
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increase the business they do together and to establish linkages that make their efforts most
competitive in the market” (BRDP 2002, 11).
The BRDP/NOrMC’s role, then, coincides with state and local goals for the biotech sector,
one of the most important clusters targeted by Vision 2020. Accordingly, BRDP implementation
directly relates to three overarching goals in Vision 2020. First, the BRDP intends to promote
the broad objective of a “learning enterprise,” whereby highly educated employees generate
efficiency and technological advances in the workplace while employers support access to
continuing education (BRDP 2002, 12). Second, by coordinating the efforts of medical
education programs, the BDRP intends to support diverse and thriving technology-intensive
industries that actively utilize Louisiana’s colleges and universities as a source for graduates,
expertise, and technology suitable for commercialization (BDRP 2002, 13). And third, the
BDRP intends to improve the standard of living in Louisiana, which implies increasing the
quality and quantity of jobs and decreasing unemployment and poverty in each region of the
State (BDRP 2002, 13). However, the BDRP has remained a largely inactive organization,
leaving the region devoid of the necessary type of biotech-specific, business-oriented leadership,
advocacy, and networking organization that has keyed the emergence of new innovative biotech
regions in the 1990s and 2000s. Tommy Kurtz, GNO, Inc.’s senior vice president over job
development, says that New Orleans needs such an advocate group to focus resources on
biotechnology strategies: “There is really no coordinating entity that is linking everything
together and representing the business side or really has that business component” (Biz New
Orleans, 11 April 2005). In contrast to the strong leadership in regions like San Diego (where
CONNECT has become a national model), Research Triangle Park, New Haven, BaltimoreWashington, and Seattle, Walcott (1999) writes that Atlanta’s lack of such leadership critically
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retards the local cluster’s development. Additionally, when compared with Atlanta and its
steady growth as a Sunbelt city in recent decades, New Orleans has, in many ways, lost an
amount of economic diversity, which researchers emphasize is necessary to support an
innovative, entrepreneurial cluster (Glasmeier 2000; Malecki 1991).
Still, the state has made some progress in recent years toward supporting economic
development through the university research agenda and in fulfilling the BDRP plan’s plea for a
biotechnology incubator in the New Orleans CBD. The legislature established the Louisiana
Gene Therapy Research Consortium (LGTRC) as a partnership among LSUHSC-New Orleans,
LSUHSC-Shreveport, and Tulane University Health Sciences Center to help lure top research
talent and funding for cell and gene therapy research and production and to encourage
entrepreneurship. The partnership’s broad goal is to promote statewide economic growth and job
creation, and its programs employ 152 individuals and have brought grants totaling more than
$36 million into the state (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 28). The LGTRC also has
worked to establish a Good Manufacturing Practices compliant facility (GMP), which
manufactures gene and cell therapeutics for use in clinical trials. The GMP aims to attract firms
as customers, some of whom hopefully would perform clinical trials or even locate facilities in
the state.
Additionally, the GMP is an important component of the state’s largest biotechnology
initiative to-date, a network of three biotechnology incubators in New Orleans, Shreveport, and
Baton Rouge, offering a total of over 180,000 sq. ft. of wet lab space as well as traditional office
space. Accounting for one third of the state’s initial $30 million investment, the New Orleans
BioInnovation Center differs from the other versions in that it is also viewed as an investment in
downtown redevelopment. Looking beyond the expected economic impact of 200 new jobs,
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Arthur Cooper, CEO of the LSU System Research and Technology Foundation in Baton Rouge,
highlights the “urban renewal” component of the New Orleans facility: "Unlike the facility in
Baton Rouge, the BioInnovation Center is really part of an urban renewal strategy; because the
center will be located downtown, the BioInnovation Center will help attract researchers and
redevelop a part of the city" (Kral 2006). This notion generally correlates with Malecki’s (1991,
310) contention that business incubators and science parks serve more as real estate policy than
as technology policy. In New Orleans’ case, an incubation “place” will supplement existing but
more passive and fragmented incubation “policies” to encourage entrepreneurship through
academic research institutions and incentives (Blakely and Nishikawa 1992). Blakely and
Nishikawa (1992) stress that such places – brick-and-mortar investments such as the
BioInnovation Center – can shape a plausible role for economic development, where the public
sector fills a structural gap by intervening at early stages in a firm’s life cycle. In this sense,
localities mobilize the “incubator metaphor” as a process model, influencing policy choices to
meet individual needs, rather than as a standard, discrete checklist item for biotechnology
strategies. Still, some degree of faddism certainly has characterized the proliferation of
biotechnology incubators and GMP facilities, since many regions list similar facilities among
their assets. For example, North Carolina’s successful incubator has operated for the past 25
years, and Houston alone currently claims four GMP labs (Blakely and Nishikawa 1991, 250;
Kral 2006).
The BioInnovation Center will house the LGTRC’s GMP facility. Additionally, a multipurpose, full-service Wet Laboratory Incubator, operated as a community resource to nurture
new businesses, would facilitate the transformation of intellectual property created in universities
and research institutions into start-up companies (BRDP 2002, 31). Under one roof, the
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BioInnovation Center would house incubator services – such as subsidized rent for start-ups,
business consulting, and streamlined access to funding sources – and access to testing facilities
to reduce fixed costs. The Center’s proponents have stressed proximity in locating the facility in
the downtown medical district. The BDRP plan suggested conversion of the long abandoned
Wirth Building on Canal Street, a location that contributes to wider efforts of downtown
redevelopment (BRDP 2002, Appendix A: 5). Also, the structure’s size allows for the inclusion
of market-rate tenants in addition to subsidized businesses that would benefit directly from
shared wet lab facilities and business development services. The BioInnovation Center’s focus
on business development demands that recruitment efforts target businesses at an early stage of
product development. For example, during early stages, many biotech firms in the New Orleans
Area have had to subcontract testing facilities in other areas (Biz New Orleans, 11 April 2005).
The BioInnovation Center would help to tie this function to the local medical cluster and to
facilitate the success and retention of existing and new local businesses. In the words of Stephen
Moye, CEO of LGTRC, the center provides a hard infrastructure component of the “value chain”
which local biotech initiatives have tried to fashion (Kral 2006). The BDRP Plan estimated that
renovations and wet lab construction would be completed by summer, 2004, at a cost of $15
million (BRDP 2002, Appendix A: 2,7).
The state legislature approved funding for the BioInnovation Center, along with similar
facilities in Baton Rouge and Shreveport, in 2002 as part of the Governor’s Biotechnology
Initiative. While Shreveport’s BioSpace 1 commenced operations in late 2005, followed by
Baton Rouge’s Louisiana Emerging Technologies Center in 2006, the New Orleans
BioInnovation Center suffered several holdups, even before Katrina. Structural problems with
the Wirth Building led engineers to determine that the structure was not suitable for the heavy
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equipment and space required for the laboratory. Instead, the Wirth Building was demolished to
allow an entirely new, 130,000 square foot structure to be completed by mid-2007 at a cost of
$30 million. With the Louisiana Gene Therapy Research Consortium initially acting as an
anchor tenant, the BioInnovation Center is expected to create 200 jobs, but supporters are even
more optimistic about its long-run effects from successful business ventures that eventually
“graduate” from the incubator. Citing statistics that claim the existence of 7000 unfilled
medical-sector jobs in the city, Mayor Nagin’s comments at the Wirth Building’s demolition
ceremony summarize this position: “What we are doing today is what I’m calling our Nissan
plant. If we do what we are talking about today, we can double those [7,000] openings” (Biz
New Orleans, 11 April 2005). Here, Nagin blurs the distinction between medical jobs and
biotechnology jobs; but while these industries may rely on the same institutions, they exist at
entirely different ends of the production chain. Biotechnology initiatives seek to bridge the gap
between university research and entrepreneurialism while medical employment intends to link a
skilled workforce with regional, state, and federal health care systems. Thus, the prospect of
creating and filling opportunities in each sector structurally differs. This degree of confusion is
compounded by the early lack of leadership in the biotechnology industry. By comparison,
Shreveport’s Biomedical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana, established in 1986,
succeeded in passing a property tax to fund the InterTech Science Park, a cluster built around
Shreveport’s Charity Hospital and LSU Health Sciences Center, which now houses a biotech
incubator. The Foundation funnels substantial assets and resources to the park and, equally as
important, provides leadership that has helped to advance completion of Shreveport’s Wet Lab
Incubator facility.
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In a third major initiative, using a $40 million bond financed by a new cigarette tax in
2002, the state legislature created another partnership between LSUHSC-New Orleans and
Tulane University HSC, the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium (LCRC), with the goal to
create a medical and scientific center for cancer research that will be recognized as the state’s
only National Cancer Institute (NCI)-Designated Cancer Center. The LCRC’s goals are to
promote better health outcomes, to enhance research and education, and to provide economic
diversity and career opportunities for Louisiana university graduates. Beyond university
research faculty support functions, the LCRC is planning and developing a 160,000 square-foot
Cancer Research Center in New Orleans to provide shared core equipment and services with a
projected financial impact of $350 million over five years (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005,
29). In March, 2005, the LCRC acquired the final piece of land for the caner center site, an
undeveloped parcel near the existing medical district, with construction then scheduled to begin
before the end of 2005 (LCRC 2005, 2).
Together, the BioInnovation Center, the LGTRC, and the LCRC, represent major
investments in biosciences. These institutions reflect an institutional approach to enhancing
university research as an economic base, and the state’s investments of over $60 million, in a
sense, reflect a linear conception of innovative growth along a “value chain” (BNOB Biosciences
Workgroup 2005, 7). Through the LGTRC and LCRC, the state hopes to recruit scientists and to
acquire higher levels of research funds. The BioInnovation Center, then, would boost the
potential for successful commercialization technologies developed in universities and research
centers – or converting basic research to applied research and retaining subsequent economic
gains within the state and, more directly, within the New Orleans region. However, as the
literature review in this thesis suggested, successful biosciences bases depend on much more
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than such soft and hard infrastructures to support a linear model of innovation. The next section
investigates the existence of a “local innovative milieu” from the perspective of the region’s
capacity for entrepreneurship and employment in biosciences.

Labor Force and Entrepreneurialism: A Local Milieu for Innovation?
In 2002, New Orleans’ universities graduated 1,053 students in biotech-related fields,
notching the region at 25th in the country in terms of total graduate output (BNOB Biosciences
Workgroup 2005, 32). Comparing this number against regions with similarly sized labor forces,
New Orleans only trails the metropolitan areas of Raleigh-Durham and Austin. Other parts of
Louisiana generated approximately 950 biotech-related graduates in 2002. Table 2 presents
several location quotients and rankings culled from a GNO, Inc. biotech workforce evaluation in
2005, and Table 3 presents a breakdown by university. The metro area also ranks 23rd in terms
of PhD graduates and 26th in terms of Professional-level graduates in biotech-related fields.
These numbers suggest that, if New Orleans developed a substantial biosciences cluster, the
region would be well positioned to provide the necessary skilled workforce, assuming a
significant level of graduate retention.
Prior to Katrina, however, New Orleans’ biotech-related employment lagged significantly
behind its output of an advanced workforce. A 2004 survey of 20 firms in the New Orleans Area
– constituting a majority of regional biotech employers 11 – conducted for GNO, Inc. reported a
total employment of about 900 workers, primarily laboratory technicians/technologists, research
specialists, research scientists. This number had grown steadily in the previous few years,
tracking closely to employment growth reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and was
11

A 2004 study for GNO, Inc. estimated a total of 24 regional biotech firms (BNOB Biosciences
Workgroup 2005, 36).
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Table 2. Biotech-related Graduates in Greater New Orleans Area
Degree

Level

Biology/Biological Sciences,
General
Pharmacy
Chemistry, General
Cell/Cellular Biology and
Anatomical Sciences
Epidemiology
Biomedical/Medical Engineering
Clinical Lab. Science/Medical
Technologist
Chemical Engineering
Chemistry, General
Cardiovascular
Technology/Technologist
Biostatistics
Neuroscience
Biochemistry
Cell/Cellular Biology and
Anatomical Sciences
Pharmacology
Cell/Cellular Biology and
Anatomical Sciences
Biomedical/Medical Engineering

Bachelor

Bio
Grads
378

Location
Rank*
Quotient**
2.06
4

Professional
Bachelor
Bachelor

107
82
68

1.04
2.04
10.19

26
10
7

Master
Bachelor
Bachelor

67
38
27

21.70
6.20
4.27

3
9
12

Bachelor
Ph. D.
Bachelor

23
21
21

.99
1.96
123.51

30
9
1

Master
Bachelor
Bachelor
Master

18
18
18
17

38.11
4.58
1.17
26.52

1
22
73
1

Master
Ph. D.

16
12

29.33
9.28

1
3

Master

11

2.89

24

SOURCE: “Biotech Workforce Evaluation,” Greater New Orleans, Inc., 17 January 2005;
retrieved October, 2006, from http://www.gnoinc.org.
*Location Quotient is defined as the ratio of the local percentage of total graduates in biotechrelated fields to the national percentage of total graduates in biotech-related fields.
**Blended rank based on absolute number ranking and percentage of total graduates ranking.
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Table 3. Largest Biotech-related Degree Programs in Greater New Orleans Area

University
LSUHSC

Biotechrelated
Graduates*
81

Major Biotech-related
Education Programs

Major Areas of
Bioscience Research

Biochemistry
Cardiovascular Technology
Clinical Laboratory Science
Genetics
Microbiology/Bacteriology
Neuroscience
Pathology

Cancer
Molecular and Human
Genetics
Neuroscience
Oral and Craniofacial
Biology

Loyola

43

Biochemistry
Chemistry

Tulane

369

Cellular Biology
Epidemiology
Biomedical Engineering
Chemical Engineering
Neuroscience
Biostatistics
Biology
Pharmacology
Chemistry
Biochemistry

Bioenvironmental
Research
Cancer Cardiovascular
Health
Gene Therapy
Genetics
Infectious Disease
Primate Research
Tropical Medicine

UNO

115

Biology
Chemistry
Cellular Biology
Biomedical Engineering
Biostatistics
Conservation & Mollecular
Genetics

Bioinformatics

Xavier

378

Biochemistry
Biology
Chemistry
Pharmacy

Bioenvironmental
Research
Clinical Science
Pharmaceutical
Science

SOURCE: SOURCE: Biotech Workforce Evaluation, Greater New Orleans, Inc., 17 January
2005 (http://www.gnoinc.org)
*Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), National Center for Education
Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.
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projected to continue to grow (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 36). Most of the region’s
20-plus biotech companies average between 3 and 5 employees, although two companies,
Reliagene Technologies and Pam Lab, employ over 70 and 100 people, respectively (20). Figure
1 maps each of these 20 companies’ addresses as listed in the Bring Back New Orleans
Commission’s Biosciences Workgroup Report (2006). Of the 20 firms, 13 provided separate
addresses. 12 From a cursory look at the admittedly partial map, no physical clustering patterns
are apparent with respect to intra-regional firm location, with firms situated variously throughout
the area’s small-office landscape and not, for example, concentrated near the downtown medical
district or in other nodes. As Walcott describes in her work on biosciences industries in San
Diego (2002) and Atlanta (1999), real estate is a central concern for biotech firms, alternately
locating near university research centers or in peripheral suburban employment and residence
nodes, depending on inter-firm and university linkages, the need to access incubator services,
facility requirements determined by the firm’s stage in the development process, etc. At this
stage, New Orleans’ nascent industry does not appear to be significantly clustering around the
downtown medical district or otherwise exhibiting spatial characteristics of agglomeration
economies.
Aside from the hard spatial features of an innovative cluster, Louisiana has also
traditionally lacked a strong culture of entrepreneurship. This partly results from access to
venture capital, which has historically been problematic and in short supply (BNOB Biosciences
Workgroup 2005, 38). Table 4 reports Louisiana’s rankings in utilizing two competitive
government grant programs for small business’ wishing to commercialize technological
innovations, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology
12

Four of the incorporated entities listed were located at the same address. Others provided P.O.
Boxes or no addresses.
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Table 4. SBIR and STTR Funding in Louisiana and Nation, 2000-2004
Year

SBIR

STTR

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Louisiana
Rank
42
39
40
44
45
50
37
50
29
47

Total grant
Money for State
$2.2M
$3.9M
$3.2M
$3.4M
$3.8M
$0
$100K
$0
$599K
$169K

Total Federal Dollars
Available
$1.1B
$1.2B
$1.5B
$1.8B
$2.0B
$63K
$62M
$95M
$102M
$209M

Percent of
Total
0.20%
0.26%
0.22%
0.13%
0.19%
0.00%
0.16%
0.00%
0.59%
0.08%

SOURCE: SBA (http://www.sba.gov/sbir/index-sttr.html), reported in Bring New Orleans Back
Commission, “Biosciences Workgroup Report,” 20 December 2005.
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Transfer (SBTT) programs. The developed high-tech environments of California and
Massachusetts account for the majority of the funds, while only a small fraction accrues to lowranked states like Louisiana. However, private sources account for considerably more
investment than government programs, and private financing networks shape the locational
tendencies of biotech areas. Mindful of their investment portfolios, venture capital firms prefer
the proximity and trust embedded in an innovative milieu. In a sense, these linkages are
“untraded interdependencies,” reflecting the importance of knowledge of not only the sort that is
created and dispersed by researchers and educational institutions but also of the level of investor
confidence and entrepreneurial know-how.
Private funding sources include two related categories of angel investors and venture
capital. Angel investors, usually wealthy individuals and/or successful entrepreneurs
themselves, usually invest a few hundred thousand dollars in seed capital at an early stage and
offer assistance in drafting a business plan, with the intention to help the young firm secure more
stable sources of venture capital. Angel investments are generally not considered significant in
Louisiana, although recent groups have attempted to address the shortage. 13 Likewise, the state
has historically been deficient in access to venture capital, which the BNOB Biosciences
Working Group (2006, 39) attributes to “a relative lack of community support for new
technology companies, the lack of strong support for the spirit of entrepreneurship within the
university environments, and weak leadership from the local finance community.” Table 5
shows that, in recent years, the state often receives less than one tenth of one percent of national
venture capital investments. Between 1990 and 2005, only two known biotech deals occurred in
Louisiana, totaling $5 million (39). Recently, the state has attempted to provide incentives for
13

Most notably, the Louisiana Angel Network has been established an attempt to increase
awareness and to link potential investors with firms in need.
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Table 5. Venture Capital Funding in Louisiana and Nation, 1996-2004

Number of Deals

Total Investment ($Millions)

Year

Nation

Louisiana

Nation

Louisiana

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

2465
3083
3555
5396
7812
4464
2610
2409
2566
2637
2277

3
9
8
9
14
10
6
1
3
3
2

10807.5
14649.9
20745.4
53454.4
104402.1
40532.8
21777.4
19646.5
22098.4
22736.9
19243.1

10.7
26.5
68.0
294.0
112.7
80.5
19.3
1.2
3.2
2.5
2.0

Louisiana Share of
Total Investment (%)
0.10
0.18
0.33
0.55
0.11
0.20
0.09
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

SOURCE: 2006 PricewaterhouseCooper/Venture Economics/NVCA MoneyTree Survey, data
current as of 18 October 2006; retrieved October 20, 2006, from http://www.pwcmoneytree.com.
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venture capital through tax credits on investments up to $1 million. Meanwhile, three new
venture capital funds – Louisiana Fund I, Louisiana Ventures, and the Louisiana Technology
Fund – have been established within the state, while GNO, Inc. and the Louisiana Department of
Economic Development have established the Capital Village to try to attract out-of-state venture
capitalists to connect with in-state entrepreneurs.
Even with recent attempts to address lagging investment, the dominant wisdom on
biotech clusters and innovative environments in general shows that public funds, while important
for strategically filling early-stage funding gaps for new firms, are no substitute for private
investment. Private investment depends critically on less quantifiable shortages, such as a
lacking “spirit of entrepreneurship,” and consequently resists easy answers. Moreover, New
Orleans’ university strengths may address a pre-condition for a thriving biotech industry, but
studies show that a research university is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for high-tech
entrepreneurship. In most biotech environments, a public agenda to support research
commercialization has largely followed rather than led cluster formation. These reasons
certainly provide evidence to temper optimism for New Orleans’ attempt to fashion a biosciences
base for economic development, despite recent initiatives to strategically enhance the university
research agenda and provide an incubation infrastructure for fostering start-ups. Rather, as
described in earlier literature reviews, development depends on a whole host of other factors,
including regional agglomeration as represented by economic diversity, a well-trained
workforce, attractive infrastructure, access to venture capital, and a local climate of
entrepreneurialism. Of course, most scholarship on the highly concentrated biotech and
biosciences-oriented economic development remains biased toward the best performing regions,
partly because these areas display a new history of development, often in stages as the local
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industry matures. In New Orleans, on the other hand, according to Aaron Miscenich, director of
the BioInnovation Center, “nothing really exists; there is no commercialization of products right
now,” notwithstanding a handful of mostly very small businesses (Kral 2006). As described in
the next section on New Orleans’ post-Katrina environment, it seems unlikely that a major urban
disaster would fit constructively into a future biotechnology success story.

Post-Katrina Challenges and Opportunities
In the first year after Katrina, the New Orleans area Bio-Med industry, as defined above,
has provided a major focus of post-Katrina recovery efforts. Since the storm’s aftermath
physically decimated health facilities and displaced care providers along with roughly half of the
city’s total population, access to health care remains one of the most immediate issues in day-today life and, along with housing supply and storm protection, a primary area of questions
regarding whether New Orleans holds sufficient infrastructure to support large-scale
repopulation. Looking more toward economic recovery and growth, the Bio-Med industry
remains targeted for efforts to diversify the city’s economic base. While major planning efforts
are currently underway, many uncertainties remain. This section will assess damage to the city’s
health care infrastructure and positioning as a regional center for life sciences R&D as they relate
to a program for economic development. Unquestionably, Hurricane Katrina and the recovery
effort will dramatically reshape the future of the Bio-Med industry in general and the downtown
medical complex in particular. Accordingly, this section assesses the recovery status of New
Orleans’ biomedical complex as an economic development project and, more generally, the
implications of a concurrent attempt to rebuild the city’s health care infrastructure after Katrina.
In the economic development framework sketched out by the Bring Back New Orleans
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Commission, clusters remain at the heart of the concepts at work in the Bio-Med sectoral
strategies:
The Bio-Med industry is commonly thought to have a synergistic effect, causing the
value of the combined industries to be more than the value of each individual component.
Pre-Katrina, New Orleans had in place a bio-med district – a physical corridor where
hospitals, medical schools and research facilities were concentrated. The concept of a
bio-med corridor or “district” is vital to the future of a health sciences industry in New
Orleans because the success, recognition and growth of hospitals, medical schools,
research facilities and emerging biotech companies are strongly interdependent (BNOB
2006, 29).
This passage underscores the importance of interdependency among institutions, firms, and
universities, as well as the necessity of economic diversity arising from agglomeration
economies. However, the role of a compact, discretely bounded, physical district in an industry
primarily sorted into the softer, more conceptual geographies of region-wide clusters remains
unclear, especially since Katrina not only directly damaged the Bio-Med district but also
severely impacted broader regional economic processes.

Damage to the Foundations of the Bio-Med Industries
Attempts to describe the hurricane damages are prone to expiration, since the situation
continues to change rapidly. However, this section briefly describes the disaster’s impact as it
relates to the New Orleans’ Bio-Med industry, highlighting the extent of challenges to building
on pre-Katrina momentum in the biosciences field. At the broadest level, Hurricane Katrina
dramatically reduced New Orleans’ population from about 450,000 in 2000 to fewer than
190,000 in summer 2006 (Louisiana Health and Population Survey 2006). 14 More specifically,
the storm dealt a crippling blow to the state’s biosciences institutions, damaging infrastructure
14

In disagreement with the household survey count of around 190,000, Mayor Nagin argues for
a population estimate of around 230,000, based on earlier analyses of other numbers, such as
utility use (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 27 September 2006).
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and displacing employees at most of the region’s hospitals, medical schools, and research
centers. Lost revenue and, in some cases, declining student bodies forced massive restructuring
of academic programs. UNO’s fall 2006 enrollment stood at roughly two-thirds of pre-Katrina
levels, and revenue shortfalls from lost student revenue and state-funding cutbacks, in addition to
over $100 million in damages, forced 700 layoffs or furloughs of part-time or adjunct faculty and
non-essential staff, several academic program reductions, and a halt to construction of a new
biotech laboratory (BNOB 2006, 32-34). Tulane’s losses exceeded $250 million, and the
university has reduced faculty and staff by approximately one third since the storm (LRA
2006a). Tulane University’s downtown institutions, including the School of Medicine and
Tulane Hospital, have reopened in phases; but the school expects a significant budgetary
shortfall for 2006 (BNOB 2006, 34). Overall, as of January 2006, losses to universities included
over 1800 faculty and staff, $223 million in revenue, and $367 million in faculty and staff
salaries and benefits, a major blow to the entire urban economy (35). Xavier, Tulane, UNO, and
LSUHSC all suffered massive damage to their biosciences research facilities, fracturing the hard
infrastructural support for the local knowledge base required to support innovation.
Another major event has been the decimation of the city’s health care system, as several
area hospitals have closed. Figure 1 compares the locations of hospitals before Katrina with
open facilities as of October 2006. Consequently, access to health care remains one of the
central preoccupations of the recovery effort. Charity Hospital, one of the nation’s oldest
medical institutions most recently under the administration of LSUHSC, represents the most
notable closure. LSUHSC furloughed 2,600 workers at Medical Center of Louisiana-New
Orleans (MCLNO, which includes Charity and University hospitals) after the storm, and the
future extent of LSUHSC’s presence in the regional health care system remains undecided.
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Charity Hospital, in particular, has long served as an enticing location for medical residencies,
playing an important role in recruiting care providers to the regional health care system. In any
case, losses to local educational, research, and clinical programs will likely continue to disrupt
the flow of research funding and hinder the ability of local medical schools to attract postgraduate residents, further undermining their ability to compete for clinical and research funding
and faculty. Additionally, the availability of funding for LSU and Tulane’s graduate medical
education (GME) programs through clinical practice, such as Medicare reimbursements from
hospitals to universities, remains in a state of flux. At the same time, the burden of
uncompensated care traditionally handled through the Charity System has shifted to the area’s
private hospitals.
Hurricane Katrina further delayed construction of the BioInnovation Center and its
component GMP facility for the LGTRC. While the site remains prepared for construction,
higher construction costs have increased the facility’s price by an estimated $20 million, which
may result in a redesign of the center. The storm also interrupted the bond financing mechanism
for the LCRC facility, now expected to require an additional $70 million, and postponed the start
of construction (LCRC 2005, 3.
Perhaps the most substantial hurricane impact as it pertains to biotechnology-based
economic development involves broad quality of life issues. From the health care system to the
school system, from infrastructure damages to the loss of residents and businesses, from
increasing utility costs to lingering questions about the levee system’s ability to guard against
another major storm surge event, New Orleans remains in a state of upheaval more than one year
after Katrina. In virtually all cases, quality of life has proven to be a more important component
of attracting and retaining a skilled workforce for innovative industries than more quantifiable

57

and controllable variables, such as tax incentives, incubator facilities, and cutting edge research.
With respect to quality of life, New Orleans likely will remain uncompetitive for the short-tomedium term even in the best-case recovery scenario. Nevertheless, as reviewed in the next
section, several post-hurricane initiatives stand to shape the future of the Bio-Med industries in
the Greater New Orleans Area.

General and Biosciences-specific Planning Projects Since the Storm
As the initial disaster response subsided, funding and planning the recovery and
rebuilding effort emerged as a central issue. In some ways, the recovery political economy acts
through a substantially altered calculus for decision-making, with competition between the
agendas of separate public agencies and private interests occurring at federal, state, regional, and
local levels. At the same time, while the hurricane-affected areas suffered massive damage to
real estate, infrastructure, private industry, and human capital, the state holds the balance of
discretion over spending large sums of federal money for redevelopment. Often, tensions have
arisen between the desire to rebuild what existed before the storm and the notion that the effected
areas, New Orleans in particular, should rebound into a more economically and environmentally
sustainable – in other words, smaller – landscape. Of course, the boundaries of these competing
visions are subject to interpretation and, thus, disagreement, especially with the rebuilding
project’s immensely unprecedented scope. In many ways, the expression of these tensions
hearkens back to a history of political antagonism between the city of New Orleans and the state
at large. While a complete account of post-Katrina planning efforts is well beyond the scope of
this section, a brief summary of planning efforts relating to the biosciences and health care
introduces new challenges and opportunities for change in the post-Katrina environment.
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The federal government has provided recovery funds primarily through flexible
Community Development Block Grants, to be spent at the discretion of the state government.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has also provided loans targeted to reestablishing
local businesses. Meanwhile, Congress responded with the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GO
Zone) to provide substantial incentives for businesses in the effected areas. The federal
government has exerted influence through Gulf Coast Recovery Czar Donald Powell and in the
realm of health care though Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt.
At the state level, Governor Kathleen Blanco established the Louisiana Recovery
Authority to direct the spending of hurricane recovery funds. The LRA’s decisions, currently in
the task force committee process, must also receive federal approval. The Road Home grant
program for housing renovations remains the LRA’s highest-profile program, but its committees
are considering nearly every type of hurricane recovery initiative. In October 2006, the
Recovery Workforce Training Program, organized by the LRA and other state-level economic
development agencies with $38 million in CDBD funds, began accepting applications from
regional workforce intermediary organizations to train workers to match high demand in key
sectors, including health care and construction (LRA 2006b).
At the local level, several massive planning efforts have sought to guide future
redevelopment, under the direction of the mayor, the city council, and most recently through the
Unified New Orleans Plan. Offering perhaps the most prominent effort, especially during a
reelection campaign, Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB) released
final reports in January 2006, with the aim of guiding requests for funding from the LRA and
Congress. This thesis has relied heavily on the BNOB report on economic development. Even
more specifically, the BNOB Technology Subcommittee Biosciences Workgroup Report,
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released separately from the comprehensive final BNOB report, provides the most current
available assessment of the industry and compares favorably with pre-Katrina reports, such as
the rosier BDRP plan, with respect to its attempts to strategically address the complexity of
regional biotechnology industries and the extent of obstacles facing implementation. 15
Potentially, the process of constructing this report through the Technology Subcommittee could
lay the basis for future collaboration toward building the effective leadership structures that have
proven necessary to support biotech clusters in other locales, especially as the BioInnovation
Center finally approaches completion. In comparison to the Biosciences Workgroup Report, the
BNOB’s economic development report on the Bio-Med industry – which drew on the
Biosciences Workgroup in combination with reports on the health care industry – suffers from
the common tendency to engage flexible definitions of terms like “biomedical,” “biosciences,”
and “biotechnology” on the local level (Cortright and Mayer 2002). More recently, the U.S.
Department of Commerce has provided the New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (RPC)
with a $300,000 grant to formally assess the regional biotechnology and biosciences industries
and to recommend a strategy for catching up not only with other parts of the nation but with the
more advanced initiatives in Shreveport and Baton Rouge. Due for completion in Spring 2007,
the RPC study and the process involved in its creation could lead to a more coordinated activist
leadership structure for the local industry.
Finally, the state has attempted to use Katrina’s decimation of the essential health care
infrastructure as an opportunity to plan a new health care system for the New Orleans region.
The next section summarizes this restructuring effort, with particular attention to the competing
agendas of various regional, state, and federal entities shaping the process. Ultimately, these
15

Admirably, the Biosciences Workgroup also includes a note of clarification regarding the
common pitfalls arising from vague definitions.
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efforts have drastic implications for the Bio-Med industry in general and, by extension, for New
Orleans’ attempts to foster biosciences and biotechnology as a base for economic development.

Restructuring Regional Health Care After Katrina
As of Fall 2006, the effort to restructure New Orleans’ health care system has gained
significant traction and stands to reshape the future of graduate medical education and
employment in the largest category of jobs included in the regional Bio-Med industries. US
Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt has prominently advocated for a
reforming a system that was “fraught with inefficiency” long before Katrina decimated its
physical and human infrastructure (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 18 July 2006). Criticsturned-reformers frequently point to the existence of a “two-tiered” system of health care in
Louisiana, where low-income populations direct the vast majority of Medicaid and indigent
dollars to the antiquated state-run Charity system while middle- and upper-income populations
direct private insurance and Medicare dollars to private hospitals and primary care clinics, which
habitually provide a relatively poor quality of care at high per-unit costs when compared against
national benchmarks for private facilities (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006). Similarly, crowding
has historically characterized public-sector facilities, most notably in the case of low-income
New Orleanians’ traditional reliance on Charity’s emergency rooms for primary care, while
private-sector beds have remained underutilized. At the state level, Louisiana routinely ranks
near the bottom of national public health ratings, including the extent of insurance coverage. A
report by Pricewaterhouse Coopers commissioned by the LRA locates much of the statewide
inadequacy on the supply-side with medical workforce characteristics. In 2003, Louisiana had
11,000 unfilled statewide healthcare openings (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006, 99). With
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respect to MDs, New Orleans’ region (Region 1) held by far the state’s highest physician to
population ratio, especially for specialty physicians. 16 According to this report, high specialty
physician concentrations in New Orleans (Region 1), Baton Rouge (Region 2), and Shreveport
(Region 9) have distorted statewide levels, masking a shortage of specialty physicians in other
more rural regions and a shortage of primary care providers throughout the state. Allied Health
professionals display similar patterns. These spatial inconsistencies likely owe to the location of
teaching institutions, teaching hospitals and medical schools in particular, and the tendency for
medical providers, residents, and skilled medical workforce to agglomerate in a given locality for
reasons relating to institutions, local market determinants of supply and demand for services, and
path dependence – in other words, reasons not entirely dissimilar to the biotech cluster model
examined above or any other type of agglomerative economic activity. Moreover, the example is
important in that it demonstrates competing priorities among agencies charged with guiding the
recovery and reform of Louisiana’s health care system. When observing a concentration of
physician specialists and Allied Health professionals, local economic development interests
might discern competitive advantage as a regionally prestigious health center; but as the
Pricewaterhouse Coopers report reflects, health care advocates might perceive inefficiency and
spatial inequity within a system primarily organized at the state level. Unquestionably, this
dynamic will shape the Bio-Med industry in the New Orleans Area as well as more specific
efforts to cultivate the downtown medical cluster. New Orleans houses two of the state’s three
medical schools (LSUHSC and TUHSC) as well as several other institutions ranging from nurse
training to technician programs that provide the vast majority of the region’s skilled medical
workforce, in addition to their capacities in biosciences-related research.
16

The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) defines Region 1 as Orleans,
Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes.
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Two major projects are underway to dramatically reshape access to health care in New
Orleans. An early draft of the LRA-sponsored Pricewaterhouse Coopers report claimed an
“overbuilt” public health infrastructure in the New Orleans region and proposed scaling-back
LSU’s involvement, casting doubt over the revitalization of the downtown medical cluster
(Times Picayune [New Orleans], 25 April 2006). At the same time, the LSU-run Charity
Hospital has habitually provided primary care for the city’s uninsured; and its closure has
scattered medical services to private clinics and hospitals where uncompensated care has risen 86
percent, even as many health care practitioners have left the city (Times Picayune [New
Orleans], 5 June 2006). Claiming irreparable damage to Charity Hospital and seizing the
opportunity to finance a state-of-the-art clinical and teaching facility to meet current standards,
LSU has partnered with the federal Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to propose a new joint
medical complex to replace both institutions’ downtown hospitals at an estimated cost of $1.2
billion, with Governor Blanco voicing support (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 20 June 2006).
Roles intended for the complex near the existing downtown medical district include conducting
research, training medical students and residents, and treating uninsured patients who, before
Katrina, would have gone to Charity Hospital. The federal share of financing, over $630 million
on the part of the VA, has already been appropriated by Congress; and LSUHSC is seeking to
finance their roughly $650 million share through a combination of grants from CDBG recovery
funds, reimbursements from insurance and FEMA for damage to Charity and University
Hospitals, 17 and loans and bonds to be retired through patient revenues. Sufficient revenue,
however, depends on the hospital’s ability to attract more paying patients than the pre-Katrina
version of LSU’s hospital system, where only 56 percent can pay for care through Medicare,
17

FEMA initially estimated damage to Charity at $27 million, while LSU claims well over $100
million.
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Medicaid, or private insurance. In an October hearing of the LRA health care and infrastructure
committees, committee members voiced skepticism regarding the need for an expensive new
facility in an area “over-bedded” even before Katrina’s massive population loss, especially
where the Charity and University hospital sites and their 551 combined beds would be left vacant
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006). Leery of long term financing risks, the state legislature has
also questioned the merits of the project. LSUHSC, on the other hand, envisions their proposed
350-bed hospital as a location for specialty services and a partial answer to the gap left by
Charity’s closure. LSUHSC also cites the importance of such facilities for maintaining
institutional prestige for research and clinical programs and for attracting residents to fulfill the
LSU’s role in the state health care system as the primary provider of graduate medical education.
Further, the complex could deliver massive repercussions throughout the local economy.
Initially, construction could generate as many as 19,000 jobs with a $2 billion impact, and the
complex could employ about 6,000 full-time workers, with an annual impact of $1.2 billion
following expected completion in 2012 (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 2 November 2006). At
the time of this writing, the future of the proposed LSU facility remains uncertain. Nonetheless,
the final result will certainly shape the downtown medical cluster. The proposed facility could
potentially provide urban infill in a large, undeveloped tract immediately adjacent to the existing
downtown medical complex. Along with the BioInnovation Center’s completion, a new LSU
hospital could push the Bio-Med industries to the forefront of efforts to redevelop a portion of
downtown, specifically the area around upper Canal Street, largely excluded from development
in recent decades. Long viewed as an obstacle to redevelopment, the nearby Iberville housing
project has been slated for eventual demolition, which likely would coincide with the proposed
expansion of the medical district. Of course, this path of redevelopment raises distributional
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issues, since public housing and public health care facilities are slated for removal, threatening
two major sites providing not only safety-net services but entire, historically entrenched social
infrastructures for low-income residents.
Ultimately, the state’s support for the new complex also depends on a second major
planning effort currently underway for a federally supported health care system and insurance
pilot project. Spearheaded by US Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt and
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) Secretary Fred Cerise, the directors of the
pilot project have expressed high hopes that the future New Orleans health care system will serve
as a model for the state and the nation. Leavitt has been particularly vocal, offering staff to assist
in the planning phase and a willingness to accommodate the transition through a flexible
application of federal Medicare and Medicaid rules and funds, provided that the new system
dramatically breaks from the old to focus more on patients and less on institutions while
achieving cost-savings in the long run (Times Picayune [New Orleans], 18 July 2006). On
October 20th, the Health Care Redesign Collaborative released a concept paper for review by
state legislature, the LRA, Leavitt’s office, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), each of which would play a role in funding the ambitious project. In spelling out a pilot
project for Region 1 reform – eventually intended to expand statewide – the concept paper
generally echoes the earlier LRA-sponsored Pricewaterhouse Coopers report, which criticizes the
existing “two-tiered” system characterized by a shortage of beds in the public-sector and a
surplus in the private-sector beds. Moreover, Leavitt, the LRA, and the BNOB plans all
generally reflect a similar rhetoric for New Orleans health care as a more patient-centric system
where the large institution model historically epitomized by Charity Hospital is replaced by a
more decentralized, community-based primary and preventive care centers, which the Redesign
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Collaborative calls a “medical homes” model (Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative
2006). In the proposed system, the high cost of expanding insurance to low-income individuals
who do not qualify for Medicaid (generally, those earning less than 200 percent of the Federal
poverty level) is balanced by cost savings from access to a managed-care network of public and
private “medical homes” and hospitals with more flexible application of Medicare and Medicaid
coverage. In accordance with the dominant paradigm of public health practice, the new system
will place additional emphasis on preventive care, health education, and public-private
partnerships across a range of regional provider networks (including hospitals, public health
units, and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs)) to ensure access to care.
However, at least two major challenges stand in the way of implementing such a bold
agenda for reform. First, from newspaper editorials to Health Secretary Leavitt’s cautionary
warnings against “individual and corporate interests” allowing the failing of implementation of
fundamental systemic changes, many reform-minded individuals fear opposition from interests
representing the old system with firmly entrenched power in the state legislature (Daily
Advertiser [Lafayette], 21 July 2006). Many reformers attribute the system’s faults to the
inefficiency and inertia of “Big” Charity – a sort of double entendre referring both to the size of
Charity’s New Orleans high-rise building and to the resistance to reform of the massive Charity
System, an institution dating back over 250 years and only lately run by LSUHSC. On the other
hand, if the Charity System finally unravels and LSUHSC’s new facility emerges as a more
specialty-driven hospital, failure to effectively extend coverage through the “medical homes”
model could result in a permanent loss of the safety net for low-income health care.
Additionally, if the pilot project fails to dissolve the “two-tiered” distinction, the state could
struggle with paying down debts on the proposed facility.
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Even before the current planning phase, the pilot project was scaled down from a
statewide initiative to focus solely on the New Orleans region. As sketched out in the Redesign
Collaborative concept paper, the pilot program for expanding insurance coverage to 80 percent
of Region 1’s 127,000 uninsured residents in the first five years will cost an estimated $383
million – $1 billion if the program expands statewide in the future. Michael Leavitt’s office,
however, has been vague regarding whether the federal level of commitment to regulatory
flexibility will extend to include additional funding. On the other hand, the more decentralized
vision for the future will likely dramatically alter the local model for health services
employment. The “medical homes” model proposes a network of primary care centers
geographically dispersed throughout the region, suggesting a decreased role for the traditional
downtown medical district. Instead, neighborhood- and community-situated health units would
deliver relatively more care and employ more workers, shifting the health care employment
paradigm away from large institutions and toward smaller enterprises.
Workforce development provides a second major challenge, albeit one thus far receiving
significantly less attention than related proposals for massive investments in physical health care
infrastructure and insurance reform currently on the table. The Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006,
98) report, probably the most extensive current study on the medical workforce, recommends a
more even statewide distribution of medical residents according to population, which would
reinforce the dearth of residency positions currently available in New Orleans’ decimated GME
infrastructure. Within the New Orleans Region, the placement of residents would decentralize as
private hospitals and community-based primary care centers take on additional residency
positions. For nurses, the report recommends more comprehensive career ladder programs with
stronger incentives to graduate LPNs to RNs, a more skilled position in greater demand, as an
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immediate opportunity to address existing workforce shortages (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006,
19, 98, 113). Fitzgerald (2006, 55-57) nominates such strategies as sound health and economic
policy, but notes that in practice health care career ladder programs remain structurally hampered
by characteristics of federal Medicare/Medicaid funding and by inadequate state investment in
community colleges. Tulane HSC and LSUHSC leadership have voiced similar concerns with
the structural inefficiencies built into the way hospitals and universities share federal funds,
especially during the current phase post-Katrina upheaval. With the LRA’s recent agreement to
use $38 million of the CDBG money for workforce development programs, there exists an
opportunity to marry health care workforce programs in Allied Health fields and supporting
occupations to the region’s remodeled health care agenda.
On the whole, however, workforce development remains a major weakness of past BioMed initiatives, both in the field of health care and in more recent attempts to stimulate the
biotechnology industry. Even in otherwise successful cases of biotechnology sectoral strategies,
a gap in workforce programs can serve as a weak link. 18 While the LRA’s funding for statewide
programs shows promise, its impact on New Orleans is far less clear than even the health care
planning effort at the time of this writing. Workforce development, along with a lack of
effective leadership in biotechnology initiatives, thus remains a proximate weakness in New
Orleans’ Bio-Med sectoral strategies.
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Fitzgerald and Leigh nominate workforce development as the major shortcoming in New
Haven’s biosciences initiatives built around Yale University.
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Conclusion: The Complex Process of Planning Economic Growth in a Recovering
Environment
With recent forays into fostering biotechnology and biosciences within the New Orleans
region laid out, several points give significant cause for skepticism regarding the potential for
biotechnology to provide the answer for regional economic diversification. First, given the high
degree of concentration in the biotechnology industry, it is unclear whether the industry will
serve as a major economic project in most regions, especially in marginal areas like New
Orleans. Even in the top tier of biotech regions, the industry has a relatively small impact on the
overall regional economy (Cortright and Mayer 2002); and biomanufacturing, perhaps the
segment of the industry most capable of generating basic employment for workers without an
advanced level of education, remains even more concentrated (Fitzgerald 2006). On the other
hand, as the industry continues to grow and to evolve, its changing spatial arrangements will
likely allow additional regions to participate at a higher absolute level, even if the vast majority
of investment remains relatively concentrated in a few regions. In this respect, New Orleans has
many competitors; but building on existing initiatives, such as the BioInnovation Center, may
allow New Orleans to capture marginal gains from the biotech industry’s maturity process. Still,
committing additional resources without more significant efforts to study and to coordinate an
agenda on the local level remains a dubious prospect with uncertain results.
Second, numerous state and local governments have adopted biotechnology as a focus of
economic development strategies in recent years. Like the cluster rhetoric through which
biotechnology is often understood, faddism and the simple fact that nearly all significantly
urbanized areas contain some component of a potential biotechnology cluster (e.g., research
universities or medical institutions) likely account for some of the popularity. As research on
innovative landscapes suggests, biotechnology firms depend critically on a rare assortment of
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local conditions, a “competitive cluster” or an “innovative milieu,” and likely will not respond to
traditional recruitment and retention programs, such as tax incentives and subsidies. Instead,
state and local governments have adopted place-based and institutional approaches, such as
science parks, biotechnology incubators, and commercialization programs for universities that
most directly benefit extremely high-skilled workers. Even before Katrina, similar efforts in
New Orleans were in many respects behind the curve set by many other peripheral biosciences
locales, including smaller regions within the state. Additionally, such strategies demand a high
rate of subsidy per directly created job (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002, 64). As is the case in
downtown New Orleans, physical investments are more driven by downtown redevelopment
than by efforts to create an infrastructure for regional innovation. Thus, both the place-based and
human components of biotechnology strategies often offer little direct benefit to those most in
need. Workforce development and associates-degree and certificate training programs offer a
possible answer to this shortcoming but usually receive much less attention and rely indirectly on
the uncertain success of top-down efforts to foster commercialization suitable to generate
demand for a sector-specific labor force. In many cases, biotech firms remain skeptical of
workers with minimum-required levels of training, such as associates degree or certificate
programs; and although several instances of programs tailored to meet biotech demand for labor
have started to change this bias in certain regions, biotech jobs may simply end up being too
much of a stretch for underserved groups (Fitzgerald 2006, 148). Even with successful
commercialization, biotech firms characteristically operate through interregional linkages at least
as much as through intraregional linkages. Thus, much of the direct, indirect, and induced
economic impact from a successful strategy leaves the constituent locale.
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Third, while biotechnology strategies have gathered momentum on the state level, to this
point, the region has lacked a key leadership and advocacy structure, either in the form of a “role
model” firm or through the efforts of an effective, locally oriented industry organization to
facilitate networking and lobbying on the behalf of regional firms. Research has demonstrated
that such structures, especially in the most recently emerging biotechnology centers, have served
an important role in cluster formation (Walcott 1999; Walcott 2002; Huag and Ness 1993). In
contrast, major state- and university-policies, like biotech incubators, have often followed rather
than led the initial formation of biotech commercialization by small- to medium-sized enterprises
in the best performing regions.
Finally, New Orleans has traditionally displayed a relatively weak local culture for
innovative entrepreneurship, as demonstrated by relatively small receipts of private and federal
sources of venture capital and a relatively late installation of state venture capital funds. Further,
with Katrina wrecking havoc on any attempt to promote “quality of life” in New Orleans, the
region is poorly positioned with respect to one of the main ingredients of an innovative
environment. New Orleans’ primary strength – its medical and biosciences research institutions
– does not, in itself, constitute a suitable basis for fostering an innovative, entrepreneurial cluster,
even before accounting for institutional losses suffered from Katrina.
As the BRDP plan states, perhaps the most significant outcome from recent initiatives is
primarily symbolic: “By investing a relatively small amount of money to implement the BRDP
and its associated wet lab incubator facility, we can drive a stake into the ground and put up a
sign that says ‘Louisiana: Open for Business’” (BDRP 2002, 18). Other recent documents, have
warned against the perils of inaction, as if failing to facilitate local bioscience commercialization
and to participate in the ongoing global evolution of the biotechnology industry would “kill the
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goose that lays the golden egg” (BNOB Biosciences Workgroup 2005, 1; BNOB 2006, 45).
However, the globally footloose nature of the industry, still marked by the process of
concentration into top regions, implies that, even if sectoral strategies and university
enhancement policies can entice the goose to New Orleans, it may lay its egg elsewhere.
Although the BNOB Commission’s “Bio-Med” category is poorly defined and somewhat
deceptively inclusive, this thesis has attempted to dig deeper into the conceptual merging of the
existing health care industry with the biotechnology industry, a more attractive category for
economic developers both with modest hopes to increase employment diversity and investment
and with loftier ambitions to play midwife in the development of a high-tech cluster. While
expecting biotechnology to provide massive direct economic impacts in the New Orleans region
may be unrealistic, prior to Katrina, health care already provided the largest source of payroll
expenditure and, after the tourism industry, the second largest source of employment (BNOB
2006, 30). Today, trailing only construction, the health care industry accounts for 32 percent of
total occupational demand in the Katrina Recovery Region requiring two years of training or less
(Brady 2006). Looking more toward the long term, the magnitude of reform slated for the
regional health care system presents a significant opportunity to merge workforce development
with public health policy goals, thus improving employment opportunities for underserved
populations and advancing health care quality outcomes. Looking broadly at the Bio-Med
industries, this thesis has advanced the notion that rebuilding the health care system might
provide a more practical direction for sectoral strategies than fostering a biotechnology industry.
However, a complex political economy dominated by competing policy priorities and
interests has shaped the New Orleans’ Bio-Med industries in recent years. In the current postKatrina rebuilding phase, an exceptionally diverse range of recovery initiatives competes for
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resources in an uncertain fiscal climate, with the balance of decision-making and funding power
existing at the federal and state levels. At the focal point of this process, New Orleans has been
characterized as a “nonregime” environment, lacking an understood agenda, depending on issuebased coalitions rather than more permanent governing arrangements, and ineffectively targeting
resources in the absence of a scheme of cooperation (Burns and Thomas 2006). Although
Hurricane Katrina placed unprecedented stresses onto a system poorly prepared to handle them, a
recent slate of planning processes provides an opportunity to unify an agenda for change – or to
further fragment and antagonize the decision-making process. The Bio-Med industries exist in
an arena marked by enormous skepticism from all sides, owing mainly to the high stakes and
high level of investment involved, but also by partially intersecting visions for change across
policymaking groups with a stake in the industry, including economic development, health care,
downtown development, and universities. Spread across various scales of governance, these
segmented agendas also frequently diverge conceptually at the level of professional
competencies and policy priorities. Greater cross-pollenization and coordination of efforts
among various policy and planning initiatives with implications for the Bio-Med industries not
only could present a more unified front for the distribution of disaster funds but also could lead
to alternative responses to ongoing challenges.
Investing in human capital to support the health care industry certainly appears to be a
practical course of action, since health care occupations account for the largest, most established,
and most in-demand component of the regional Bio-Med industries. Lending a broader context
to this assertion, Markusen (2004) presents a case for occupational targeting in addition to
industrial targeting, especially in contemporary economies where workers, firms, and industrial
geographical arrangements offer declining levels of long-term commitment to localities. She
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recommends targeting occupations that appear to be “(1) be highly skilled, (2) show growth
potential, (3) cluster spatially, (4) cross-fertilize with other sectors, (5) encourage
entrepreneurship, and (6) match the potential of the areas workforce” (Markusen 2004, 266).
Health care occupations not only meet each of these criteria but also account for a massive share
of the regional economy (68,664 jobs pre-Katrina) and the vast majority of employment in the
Bio-Med sector (94.6 percent) (BNOB 2006, 30). Unlike manufacturing or high-tech industries,
primary health care provides a stable source of inherently local demand, much of which is
financed at the federal level, while specialty care may generate income from outside the region.
Moreover, the industry has trended upward in recent decades. Between 1970 and 2001, health
care consumption doubled to 14 percent of U.S. GDP; and this number is expected to rise to 17
percent by 2011 (DeVol and Koepp 2003, 1). Many of these jobs are attainable for lower-skilled
workers. While graduate medical education is an important component of regional health care
systems, several additional medical workforce components require significantly less training,
including a variety of health care support occupations and allied health professions. Fitzgerald
(2006, 57) highlights widespread shortages in Registered Nurses, nurse’s aids, and other health
care paraprofessionals and emphasizes the conduciveness of these occupations to career ladders.
However, despite successes in a few pilot projects, job ladder and training initiatives face a
shortage of funding for relevant community college programs at the state level, even as federal
policy (Medicare and Medicaid) structurally regulates that many of these high-stress, belowminimum wage occupations are governed simultaneously by high demand and “cost
containment” guidelines (55-56).
In the Hurricane Katrina-effected area, however, the LRA has already set aside $38
million that can be used for workforce training in the health care sector. If the Region 1 Health
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Care Redesign Collaborative’s recommendations go into effect, the “medical homes” network
for delivering services will demand a decentralized staffing model for a wide range of health care
occupations, the precise organization of which is unclear at this point; and the Collaborative’s
proposals for extending insurance coverage will likely increase the initial demand for a wide
range of medical services, assuming that expanded networks of health care succeed in capturing
a larger segment of the population. However, while asking for $120 million for income
guarantees and incentives for doctors, dentists, psychiatrists, RNs, and licensed professional
staff, the concept paper makes little mention of workforce development for health care support
occupations at the lower end of the spectrum (Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative
2006).
As a preliminary framework, the concept paper illustrates that, in practice, health care
policymakers typically engage workforce development and job creation (typically
preoccupations of the economic development field) as a secondary considerations. 19 With the
exception of higher-end GME programs, demand has primarily determined considerations for the
health care workforce. In contrast, supply-side approaches, such as occupational targeting and
strategic career ladder programs for health professionals and support occupations, could begin to
fill existing structural medical workforce gaps. As a result, a more workforce-oriented
perspective could help to unify and mutually advance both roles of the Bio-Med industry: to
staff a system for delivering health care services and to provide a source of jobs and economic
growth. By this reasoning, investing in human capital would emerge as a primary concern for

19

For another example, LSUHSC has responded to the LRA and legislature’s skepticism over
the proposed new hospital in downtown New Orleans by adding claims of massive economic
impacts to the hospital’s envisioned role in the health care and graduate medical education
systems, while arguably glossing over initial questions regarding the need for an expensive new
hospital to serve a smaller post-Katrina region.
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health care reform. For their part, economic developers and economic geographers have made
little attempt to render the widely recognized contributions of health care to the regional
economy explicit. Similarly, this thesis has focused mainly on biosciences and biotechnology
and, more specifically, how economic development theory and practice gravitates to such hightech industries; but health care occupations in some cases may provide a more realistic, more
tangible alternative target for Bio-Med economic policies. Additional research should further
articulate the regional structures and impacts of health care, placing the industry and its
workforce in a more refined economic context than its relative absence from the literature would
suggest.
In contrast, spatially concerned economic disciplines have more extensively considered
biotechnology and other high-tech industries, but the precise workings of such clusters remain
under-expressed. This literature somewhat understandably has paid relatively little attention to
the trajectories of marginal areas like New Orleans. The radically unsettled landscape of postKatrina New Orleans is certainly not an ideal laboratory for investigating the empirical
mechanisms of cluster formation. Rather, this thesis has focused on the structural and discursive
components of policy formation, particularly the institutions, political entities, and definitions
that mediate the conceptualization of biotechnology and health care in sectoral strategies. In this
respect, New Orleans serves as an apt window into the piecemeal mobilization of ambiguous
cluster concepts, as well as the politically and economically constrained strategies that follow.
Future research and policy should further attempt to unpack the assumed linkages internal and
external to the diversely constituted Bio-Med category and should strive for more
comprehensive, more closely aligned approaches to health and economic policies.
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